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ARTICLES 
INHERIT THE CLOUD:   
THE ROLE OF PRIVATE CONTRACTS  
IN DISTRIBUTING OR DELETING  
DIGITAL ASSETS AT DEATH 
 
Natalie M. Banta* 
 
We live in a world permeated with technology.  Through our online 
accounts we write emails, we store pictures, videos, and documents, we pay 
bills and conduct financial transactions, we buy digital books and music, 
and we manage loyalty programs.  Digital assets have quickly replaced 
physical letters, pictures, books, compact discs, and documents stored in 
filing cabinets and shoeboxes.  The emergence of digital assets raises 
pressing questions regarding the treatment of digital assets at an account 
holder‟s death.  Unlike digital assets‟ physical counterparts, an account 
holder does not control the ultimate fate of digital assets.  Instead, digital 
assets are controlled by a private contract entered into by an account 
holder and a company that provides services or digital products.  This 
Article explores the growing conflict between traditional succession 
practices and digital asset succession, which is controlled by digital asset 
contracts.  It begins by tracing the development of private contracts as a 
method of transferring assets at death and shows that although contracts 
are regularly used to transfer assets at death, digital asset contracts have 
taken an unprecedented step of prohibiting or severely limiting the transfer 
of assets at death.  This Article next explores the prevalence of digital 
assets and explains how service providers address digital asset inheritance 
in private contracts.  It argues that digital asset contracts that deny 
inheritance may be validly formed but should be void as a matter of public 
policy because they transfer decision-making power about assets from an 
individual account holder to corporations.  As our control over the ultimate 
fate of our digital assets diminishes, the nature of our property interests in 
digital assets also shifts away from our traditional understanding of 
ownership of personal property.  It argues that we should take a conscious 
approach to reforming succession law based on time-honored principles of 
American succession law that benefit society as a whole and not allow 
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private contracts controlling digital assets to hijack our system of 
inheritance.  This Article concludes by offering suggestions for reform and 
action before the ability to transfer and preserve digital assets falls beyond 
our reach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We live on the internet, but what happens when we die there?  The 
internet and computers facilitate nearly every aspect of our personal lives.1  
Our personal records, tax filings, bills, music, communication, books, 
photos, videos, and even journal entries are stored on our computer or in 
―the cloud‖ in digital form.2  It is estimated that an average American 
 
 1. Digital assets are also prevalent in our professional lives, but this Article focuses on 
personal digital assets, not assets that may be controlled by an employer such as work email 
or hard drives. 
 2. The ―cloud‖ refers to a network of computer servers or related software owned and 
maintained by a third party and which is accessible through the internet. See Eric Griffith, 
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regularly accesses more than twenty password-protected sites, all of which 
could store personal information or assets.3  Our use of online accounts has 
created a new asset known as ―digital assets.‖  Digital assets include an 
individual‘s email accounts, personal webpages, blogs, social networking 
sites, documents, videos, or photo storage sites.  Technological innovations 
will most likely expand this list in the future, and digital assets are 
becoming more economically valuable.  For example, an individual can 
own lucrative domain names or accounts with stored financial value like 
Paypal or frequent flyer memberships.  Digital assets may also include an 
individual‘s valuable media purchased in electronic format such as movies, 
television shows, music, and books.  Although some of these assets, like 
personal email accounts, may not have extrinsic monetary value, they may 
hold significant emotional value.  Despite the increasing significance of 
digital assets in our lives and their growing economic and personal value, 
the law is currently unclear on whether we can control the fate of digital 
assets after death. 
American succession law favors what is called dead-hand control or the 
freedom to control the disposition of property at death, primarily through 
legal instruments such as wills and trusts.  Most Americans understand that 
if they own physical property (real or personal) they have the right to 
control that property during their lives, and they have the right to control 
who obtains that property at their death.4  The right to devise is one of the 
most significant property rights in American law.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has recognized that the power to devise property has been part of the 
―Anglo-American legal system since feudal times.‖5  Indeed, courts and 
legislatures consider a testator‘s intention the lodestar in determining how 
assets are transferred.6  Americans expect to have decision-making control 
over how their belongings are distributed at their death, and until recently, 
contracts have regularly been used to effectuate the intention of a decedent.  
But this expectation is coming into stark conflict with emerging contracts, 
most clearly demonstrated by contracts governing digital assets. 
Digital assets come in a variety of forms and have many different 
purposes.  For purposes of this Article, I have grouped different kinds of 
digital assets together intentionally in order to show a broader trend in 
succession law.  Digital assets all have one striking similarity—the 
inheritability of the asset is controlled by a private contract between a 
 
What Is Cloud Computing?, PC MAGAZINE (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/ 
0,2817,2372163,00.asp. 
 3. Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, A Digital Afterlife, SLATE (Sept. 16, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/09/digital_assets_how_do_you_handl
e_a_loved_one_s_online_accounts.html. 
 4. RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW:  THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
DEAD 57 (2010) (―This right to control the disposition of property at death is central to the 
American psyche.  Although people are often vague in their understanding about many 
aspects of the law, one thing they do know is that they can write a will that controls who 
will—and who will not—get their property after they die.‖). 
 5. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987). 
 6. JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 1 (9th ed. 
2013). 
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company that provides a service or product (like Google, Facebook, Yahoo! 
or Apple) and an individual who uses the company‘s services or purchases 
a digital product.  Under these private contracts, or terms of service 
agreements, a user often agrees that her digital assets cannot be transferred 
to a user‘s family or friends at her death.  In other words, digital asset 
contracts often limit the descendibility and devisability of digital assets.7  If 
an agreement is silent as to descendibility, companies may have written 
policies that address whether the digital assets may be devised.  Although 
private contracts have always played an important role in American 
succession law, these emerging private contracts controlling digital assets 
are poised to violate the fundamentals of American succession law. 
Our dead-hand control over our digital assets differs significantly from 
our dead-hand control over our physical, tangible assets.  Although we can 
control our digital assets during life (for example by deleting email 
accounts, posting or removing pictures or comments from online accounts, 
or donating or giving frequent flyer miles to friends and family), when we 
die, we lose control over how our digital assets are treated.  A provision in a 
will concerning our digital assets—unlike a provision concerning physical 
assets—may have no effect on the ultimate distribution of those assets.8  In 
addition, due to contractual provisions controlling our digital assets, we 
may not be able to adequately prepare for a decline in mental or physical 
capacity by ensuring that our caretakers or fiduciaries have access to our 
digital assets and online accounts. 
Several scholars and students have encouraged legislative reform and 
suggested ways to plan for a digital estate,9 but scholarship has not yet 
explored the overreaching transformation of succession law in allowing 
contracts to prohibit an asset from being descendible.  This Article 
identifies and explores the quiet but dramatic shift taking place in American 
succession law through the use of private contracts.  It argues that although 
contracts are a time-honored way to transfer assets according to the 
testamentary intent of a decedent, they should only be valid when they are 
bound by the policies and principles of succession law, namely when they 
 
 7. Descendibility means than an asset is capable of being transferred to a decedent‘s 
heirs by intestate succession. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 539 (10th ed. 2014).  
Devisability means that an asset may be transferred to whomever a decedent named in her 
will. See id. at 547. 
 8. Gerry W. Beyer & Naomi Cahn, Digital Planning:  The Future of Elder Law, 9 
NAELA J. 135, 150 (2013) (―Wills can be an awkward method of planning for the 
disposition of digital assets. . . .  Moreover, it is unclear whether service providers will even 
respect the terms of wills to transfer ownership of digital assets.‖). 
 9. See generally id.; Jamie P. Hopkins, Afterlife in the Cloud:  Managing a Digital 
Estate, 5 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 209 (2013); Jason Mazzone, Facebook‟s Afterlife, 90 
N.C. L. REV. 1643 (2012); John Conner, Comment, Digital Life After Death:  The Issue of 
Planning for a Person‟s Digital Assets After Death, 3 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 
301 (2011); Noam Kutler, Note, Protecting Your Online You:  A New Approach to Handling 
Your Online Persona After Death, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1641 (2011); Kristina Sherry, 
Note, What Happens to Our Facebook Account When We Die?:  Probate Versus Policy and 
the Fate of Social-Media Assets Postmortem, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 185 (2012); Tyler G. Tarney, 
Note, A Call for Legislation to Permit the Transfer of Digital Assets at Death, 40 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 773 (2012). 
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facilitate transfer according to the testamentary intent of a decedent.  Newly 
emerging contracts, most clearly illustrated by digital asset contracts, 
threaten the very nature of American succession law by allowing parties to 
opt out of one of the most fundamental rights of property—the right to 
devise.  Although such contracts may be valid under the principles of 
contract law, the terms of the contracts violate the principles of succession 
law.  Contracts that prohibit descendibility of personal assets should be void 
as a matter of public policy. 
Part I traces the development of private contracts as a tool for succession 
and argues that contracts play an integral role in American succession law, 
especially as assets change form and develop in our modern society.  Part I 
introduces the rise of digital assets and gives an overview of how most 
online service providers‘ contracts deal with inheritance.  It also highlights 
some of the unique problems presented if digital assets are not descendible 
like other personal assets, especially as reliance on digital assets increases. 
Part II argues that any contractual provision that prohibits transfer, even 
if procedurally valid, should be void as against public policy.  Prohibiting 
contracts from transferring assets fundamentally alters the character of 
succession law, which promotes transfer guided by the testamentary intent 
of a decedent, and is contrary to the reason contracts were originally 
accepted as a means of transfer.  Nowhere is this problem more apparent 
than in contracts governing digital assets, which take the unprecedented 
step of contractually limiting inheritance.  Part II demonstrates that the 
current response of state legislatures and courts is to favor the public policy 
of allowing digital assets to be devised.  Lastly, it explores why internet 
service providers have taken this radical step of denying inheritance and 
criticizes companies‘ potential justifications for doing so. 
Part III offers suggestions for reform and contends that if the public does 
not respond to these contractual terms, inertia will be on the side of internet 
service providers to dictate the distribution or destruction of digital assets.  
Public pressure may be the only effective way to force companies to 
reshape their digital asset contracts and policies.  Part III argues that the 
nonprobate system of asset transfer is an excellent model for companies that 
provide online services or products and supports digital asset contracts as 
long as they allow a method of transfer at death according to the decedent‘s 
testamentary intent.  It then argues that if a testator‘s testamentary intent 
concerning digital assets is unknown, the beneficiaries‘ desires and needs 
should receive preference over the service provider‘s default policy of 
prohibiting descendibility. 
I.   CONTRACTING INHERITANCE 
Digital assets are not the first kind of asset to be distributed according to 
the terms of a private contract.  Transferring assets according to a private 
agreement (instead of by a will through the probate system) is a common 
practice in today‘s estate planning.10  This part shows that private contracts, 
 
 10. See infra Part I.A. 
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bound by the principles of succession law, have been an accepted tool to 
transfer assets for hundreds of years.  Private contracts have been especially 
effective and efficient in transferring assets that are newly recognized or 
created in an ever-developing society.  This part argues that as long as 
contracts have worked to promote succession controlled by the testamentary 
intent of a decedent, courts and legislatures have accepted them as a valid 
means of transferring assets at death and have upheld the contractual terms 
in the face of contrary provisions in wills or contests among beneficiaries.  
Contracts, however, are beginning to undermine our system of succession.  
Nowhere is this problem more apparent than in contracts governing digital 
assets, which take the unprecedented and extraordinary step of prohibiting 
and controlling descendibility.  This part then explores the dramatic rise of 
digital assets and gives an overview of the myriad ways in which digital 
asset contracts restrict and control descendibility. 
A.   Using Private Contracts As Tools to Devise Property 
The English system of distributing property upon death, which was 
adopted by the American colonies, has historically been accomplished 
through probate courts, controlled by a testator‘s will or by intestacy 
statutes.11  But nonprobate transfers through some form of private 
agreement have been used as an alternative to the public probate system for 
hundreds of years.12  The signature characteristic of nonprobate transfers is 
that the transfer occurs according to an agreement between private parties, 
not according to a state-supervised probate system.13  As the nature of 
wealth changed from being held in land to being held in financial accounts, 
 
 11. See Lewis M. Simes & Paul E. Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in 
America:  I, 42 MICH. L. REV. 965, 977–82 (1944) (describing the adoption of English 
probate courts in America).  Trusts have been used as well, but probate was the primary 
vehicle of transmission until recent times.  The trust gained popularity in the 1960s after 
Norman Dacey wrote an influential book entitled How to Avoid Probate. See LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS:  A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW 106 
(2009).  State legislatures passed wills acts that establish clear rules for making a will.  If an 
individual follows the prescriptions of a state‘s wills act in drafting and executing her will, 
she can be assured that her wishes will be followed when she dies.  If an individual has not 
left a will that meets the requirements of the wills act, the assets are distributed according to 
the laws of intestacy, which presume the intent of an ordinary testator. DUKEMINIER & 
SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 63. 
 12. John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the Property Restatement and the Uniform 
Probate Code:  Reformation, Harmless Error, and Nonprobate Transfers, 38 ACTEC L.J. 1, 
10 (2012) (―Will substitutes are not new.  There is a sense in which the nonprobate system 
extends all the way back to the fourteenth century, when the trust device first emerged in 
English law.‖). 
 13. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of 
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1110–12 (1984) (stating that beneficiary designation in 
life insurance policies, pension accounts, and bank, brokerage, and mutual fund accounts are 
the functional equivalents of will devises); Grayson M.P. McCouch, Probate Law Reform 
and Nonprobate Transfers, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 758–59 (2008) (―Will substitutes, as the 
name implies, are designed to achieve the practical effect of a will—designating 
beneficiaries to receive property at the owner‘s death—outside the probate system. . . .  
[W]ill substitutes ordinarily take the form of a gift, trust, contract, or other nontestamentary 
arrangement . . . .‖). 
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the nonprobate system of succession became more prominent.14  Lawrence 
Freidman noted that ―in the twentieth century, will substitutes grew like 
mushrooms.‖15  Today, more wealth transfers occur outside probate by 
private agreement than in probate by will.16  Nonprobate transfers include 
instruments such as revocable trusts, life insurance policies, retirement 
accounts and pay-on-death accounts, and private contracts.  These 
instruments arose because of a need for flexibility and efficiency, and courts 
uphold them as valid private methods of transferring assets at death 
according to the intention of a decedent. 
Trusts are the oldest form of a private contract used to distribute assets 
without using the public court system.  Trusts divide ownership of an asset 
between a trustee, who holds legal title, and a beneficiary, who holds 
equitable title.17  A trustee administers and distributes trust assets to a 
beneficiary in accordance with a trust agreement.  Trusts, much like wills, 
were originally used to transfer real property at death.18  The trust 
developed, however, as a way to avoid using a will and therefore avoid the 
stringent feudal rules controlling the laws of real estate such as the law of 
primogeniture, tax laws, and laws limiting devisability.19  By transferring 
real property to trusts, landowners were able to avoid primogeniture laws 
and provide for their wives, daughters, and younger sons, avoid some 
taxation, and allow the family to continue to use the land after the 
landowner‘s death.20  Trusts, then, were created to avoid the immutable 
probate laws and to provide a means to transfer assets in a way that best 
effectuated a settlor‘s intent. 
Born out of a need for flexibility, trusts have become a key instrument in 
managing, administering, and transferring financial assets in the modern 
era.21  Although trusts are an old tool, they are used in a modern way to 
give a settlor more control over her assets after her death.  A trust‘s 
flexibility allows settlors to plan for the distribution of many different kinds 
 
 14. John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth 
Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 723 (1988) (―Into the eighteenth century, land was the 
dominant form of wealth.  The technological forces that broke up older family-centered 
modes of economic organization called forth two new forms of private-sector wealth.  One 
category is what we today call financial assets . . . which now comprise the dominant form 
of wealth.‖). 
 15. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 110. 
 16. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 435; Langbein, supra note 12, at 10 (―The 
deepest trend now affecting the day-to-day reality of gratuitous transfers in the United States 
is the nonprobate revolution, by which I mean the burgeoning use of will substitutes to 
transfer property on death.‖); McCouch, supra note 13, at 759. 
 17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003). 
 18. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 
632–33 (1995). 
 19. See R.H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1503, 
1510–11 (1979). 
 20. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 387; Carly Howard, Trust Funds in 
Common Law and Civil Law Systems:  A Comparative Analysis, 13 U. MIAMI INT‘L & COMP. 
L. REV. 343, 349–50 (2006). 
 21. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 385; FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 103. 
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of assets.22  Because trusts are a private agreement between a settlor and a 
trustee, trusts also provide the added benefit of privacy.  In many ways, 
trusts are conceptually similar to a third-party beneficiary contract—a 
trustee promises a settlor to manage trust assets prudently and distribute 
them to beneficiaries according to the terms that a settlor has dictated in the 
trust.23  The purpose of a trust is to distribute a settlor‘s assets, and the 
distribution of assets is controlled solely by the intent and desires of a 
settlor.  Although private parties control the distribution of assets, state law 
controls the creation, interpretation, and enforcement of trusts.24  Twenty-
five states have adopted the Uniform Trust Code, which provides a 
codification of the law of trust administration.25  Trusts, as a private 
agreement between parties, play an important role in asset distribution and 
are protected and enforced by state courts and legislatures.26 
 
 22. Estate planners have turned to the trust as the most flexible estate-planning tool in 
the arsenal in an attempt to preserve digital asset inheritance.  As one estate planner has 
described, ―Many digital assets take the form of licenses, which can be transferred to a trust.  
In the event of the client‘s death or disability, the trustee has the authority to manage the 
assets and transfer them to the beneficiaries according to the client‘s instructions.‖ Joseph M. 
Mentreck, Estate Planning in a Digital World, 19 PROB. L.J. OHIO 195 (2009).  It is unclear 
whether these trusts, known as digital asset protection trusts, will be a valid way to ensure 
distribution of digital assets.  Even a trust cannot solve the problem of digital assets where 
the terms of service agreement prevents transferability.  In order to place an asset in a trust 
the owner must have the ability to transfer the property. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 40 cmt. d (―If the owner of property cannot transfer it to another to be held for the 
other‘s own benefit, usually . . . the owner will not be able . . . to transfer it to another to be 
held in trust . . . .‖). 
 23. See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust:  The Trust As an Instrument of 
Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 185 (1997). 
 24. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 387–88. 
 25. ALA. CODE §§ 19-3B-101 to -1305 (2007 & Supp. 2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 14-10101 to -11102 (2012 & Supp. 2013); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-73-101 to -1105 
(2011); D.C. CODE §§ 19-1301.01 to -1311.03 (2012 & Supp. 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 736.0101-.1303 (West 2012 & Supp. 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58a-101 to -1107 (2008 
& Supp. 2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B §§ 101–1104 (2012 & Supp. 2013); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 203e, §§ 101–1013 (2011 & Supp. 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 700.7101–.8206 
(2012 & Supp. 2013); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 456.1-101 to .11-1106 (2007 & Supp. 2014); NEB. 
REV. STAT. §§ 30-3801 to -38,110 (2010 & Supp. 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. §§ 564-B:1-101 to 
B:12-1205 (2006 & Supp. 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 46A-1-101 to -11-1105 (2003 & 
Supp. 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-C-1-101 to -11-1104 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 59-
09-01 to -19-02 (2010 & Supp. 2013); OHIO REV. CODE Chs. 5801.01–5811.03 (2006 & 
Supp. 2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 130.001–.910 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013); 20 PA. 
CONS. STAT. §§ 7701–7799.3 (2014 & Supp. 2014); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-7-101 to -1106 
(2009 & Supp. 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 35-15-101 to -1103 (2007 & Supp. 2013); UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 75-7-101 to -1201 (1993 & Supp. 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 101–
1204 (2010 & Supp. 2013); VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 64.2-700 to -808 (2012 & Supp. 2013); W. 
VA. CODE §§ 44D-1-102 to -11-1105 (2010 & Supp. 2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-10-101 
to -1103 (2013). 
 26. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS 1.1 intro. note (defining trusts); see also 
Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600, 608–09 (Ill. 1955) (upholding a trust as a valid inter 
vivos trust, despite its ―testamentary look‖); Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, The 
Prudent Investor Rule and Trust Asset Allocation:  An Empirical Analysis, 35 ACTEC L.J. 
314, 315 (2010) (asserting that state legislatures play a significant role in trust 
administration). 
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Traditional contracts also play an important role in the transfer of wealth 
today.  Life insurance, pay-on-death bank accounts, transfer-on-death 
security accounts, and pension and retirement accounts are transferred upon 
death to named beneficiaries according to the terms of an agreement.27  The 
main purpose of these agreements is to transfer assets held in an account 
upon death.28  The distribution of these assets is controlled directly by the 
testamentary intent and desires of an account holder. 
The significance of life insurance and other financial account private 
contracts has increased as assets have changed from real property to liquid 
financial accounts.29  Like trusts, life insurance companies have existed in 
America from its founding.30  Life insurance companies gained momentum 
and popularity as the American agricultural economy transitioned to an 
industrialized economy.31  In the first life insurance case in Massachusetts 
state court in 1815, the court confronted the question of whether a life 
insurance policy was an enforceable contract as a means of transferring 
wealth.32   The court found that it met the requirements of a valid contract 
and was ―not repugnant to the general policy of the laws,‖ and upheld the 
agreement.33  Today, life insurance policies play an important role in 
transferring wealth at the death of a family member.  Seventy percent of 
American families have some type of life insurance policy.34  In 2012, 
beneficiaries of life insurance policies received $60 billion in benefit 
payments.35  Americans rely on private contracts between decedents and 
insurance companies to ensure that their financial needs are met. 
Pension and retirement accounts are also controlled by contract.  Like life 
insurance policies, pension and retirement accounts have increased in 
importance as a method of wealth transfer in the modern American 
economy.  Professor John Langbein described pension funds as ―another 
artifact of the new forms of wealth that arose in consequence of the breakup 
of older, family-centered modes of production.‖36  The growth of private 
 
 27. Langbein, supra note 12, at 10. 
 28. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 470, 476, 489. 
 29. See supra notes 13, 14, 16 and accompanying text. 
 30. SHARON ANN MURPHY, INVESTING IN LIFE:  INSURANCE IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 1 
(Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2010).  According to Murphy, the first life insurance company 
in America was created in 1809 by the Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on Lives and 
Granting Annuities.  It received its charter about two years later. Id. 
 31. Id.; VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS:  THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 10, 12 (1979). 
 32. Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 115 (1815). 
 33. Id. at 116–17 (―By the common principles of law, however, all contracts fairly made, 
upon a valuable consideration, which infringe no law, and are not repugnant to the general 
policy of the laws, or to good morals, are valid, and may be enforced, or damages recovered 
for the breach of them. . . .  This is a contract fairly made; the premium is a sufficient 
consideration; there is nothing on the face of it, which leads to the violation of law; nor any 
thing objectionable on the score of policy or morals.‖). 
 34. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, 2013 LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 49, 63 (2013), 
available at https://www.acli.com/Tools/Industry%20Facts/Life%20Insurers%20Fact% 
20Book/Pages/RP13-005.aspx. 
 35. Id. at 91. 
 36. Langbein, supra note 14, at 739. 
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pension funds and retirement accounts blossomed after World War II, and 
today‘s funds hold an immense amount of wealth.37  In 2013, total 
retirement assets in America were estimated to be $22.7 trillion and made 
up about 34 percent of household assets.38  Thus, middle class Americans‘ 
most valuable asset may be their life insurance policies or financial 
accounts, and these assets are usually transferred outside of the probate 
system according to the terms of a private agreement.39  Almost two-thirds 
of American families‘ wealth are held and distributed according to private 
contracts of pension and retirement accounts.40 
State courts and legislatures have embraced private contracts as a means 
to transfer wealth in the modern age.  Courts generally uphold contractual 
terms against claims of contrary provisions in a decedent‘s will.  For 
example, courts have routinely upheld life insurance and pay-on-death 
contract beneficiary designations even if they conflict with subsidiary laws 
of wills, such as the practice under probate codes that a divorce operates as 
a revocation.41  In addition, state statutes provide that parties may rely on 
third-party‘s contractual terms to wholly govern beneficiary designations 
upon death.42 
The growth of life insurance, pension accounts, and retirement accounts 
reveals a familiar pattern—whenever a new asset is created or repackaged, 
private contracts spring up to control the distribution of those newly created 
assets.  Reproductive material, like these nonprobate transfers, is another 
example of a newly created asset where its descendibility is controlled by 
private contract.43  Due to technological advances in medicine, reproductive 
material can now be stored and successfully used to create human life after 
 
 37. Id. at 740. 
 38. Retirement Assets Total $23.0 Trillion in First Quarter 2014, INV. CO. INST., 
http://www.ici.org/research/stats/retirement/ret_14_q1 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:  WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 
cmt. e (2003) (acknowledging that insurance contracts are usually controlled by private 
agreement but can also be part of a will); DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 470. 
 40. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 479. 
 41. Nunnenman v. Estate of Grubbs, 374 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010) (―An IRA 
constitutes a contract between the person who establishes the IRA for his or her retirement 
and the financial institution that acts as the custodian of the IRA.  Like an insurance policy, 
an IRA includes designation of beneficiaries to receive the residue in the event of the 
retiree‘s death.  The rules pertaining to the construction of contract are well-settled . . . .‖ 
(citations omitted)); Varela v. Bernachea, 917 So. 2d 295, 288–89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) 
(upholding joint account holder‘s withdrawal of funds from a joint account with right of 
survivorship); Cook v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc‘y, 428 N.E.2d 110, 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1981) (―Public policy requires that the insurer, insured, and beneficiary alike should be able 
to rely on the certainty that policy provisions pertaining to the naming and changing of 
beneficiaries will control except in extreme situations.‖); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 
793, 797–98 (Iowa 1976) (upholding life insurance beneficiary designation to divorced 
spouse). 
 42. For example, a Washington statute provides, in relevant part, that ―[i]n transferring 
nonprobate assets, a . . . third party may rely conclusively and entirely upon the form of the 
nonprobate asset and terms of the nonprobate asset arrangement in effect on the date of death 
of the owner.‖ WASH. REV. CODE § 11.11.040 (2013). 
 43. MADOFF, supra note 4, at 41. 
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a donor of reproductive material has died.44  No federal or state statutory 
system governs the disposition of reproductive material.45  Instead, 
contracts between donors and clinics govern the disposition of a donor‘s 
reproductive material.46  Standard sperm donor agreements, for example, 
include a provision for a donor to direct how his sperm should be treated in 
the event of his death.47  Like other traditional contracts used to distribute 
assets at death, the agreements controlling reproductive material allow a 
donor to indicate whether an asset should be destroyed or distributed to 
others.48  Private agreements allow for flexibility and efficiency, and ensure 
that a testator‘s testamentary intent will be honored. 
In the few court decisions that have examined private contracts governing 
reproductive materials, courts have upheld the disposition of reproductive 
materials according to the terms of the agreement.49  In a recent case in 
California, In re Estate of Kievernagel,50 a California Court of Appeal 
found that the terms of a sperm donor‘s agreement with a company storing 
the donor‘s frozen sperm trumped the interest of the sperm donor‘s 
widow.51  The agreement between the donor and the company allowed the 
donor to decide upon his death or incapacitation whether he wanted his 
sperm to be destroyed or donated to another (presumably his wife).52  The 
donor had checked a box and initialed on the agreement that he wanted the 
company to destroy his sperm sample at his death.53  After his death, his 
wife petitioned the court to set aside the contract and deliver his sperm to 
her.54  The court held that the contract controlled and the company was to 
destroy the donor‘s sperm.55  In another California case, Hecht v. Superior 
Court,56 an agreement between the company preserving a donor‘s sperm 
provided that, upon a donor‘s death, the sperm bank would continue to store 
the sperm or release it to the donor‘s executor.57  Despite objections from 
family members (who wanted the sperm destroyed), the executor obtained 
 
 44. Id. at 41–42. 
 45. Id. at 42. 
 46. Id. at 41–42. 
 47. Id. at 42–43. 
 48. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 313 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(―The Agreement provided the sperm sample was to be discarded upon [the decedent‘s] 
death.  This option was selected instead of the option to donate the sperm sample to [his 
spouse].‖); Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276–77 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating 
that the agreement with the sperm bank authorized release of the sperm to Ms. Hecht). 
 49. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (―[A]n agreement regarding 
disposition of any untransferred preembryos in the event of contingencies (such as the death 
of one or more of the parties, divorce, financial reversals, or abandonment of the program) 
should be presumed valid and should be enforced as between the progenitors.‖). 
 50. 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 51. Id. at 312. 
 52. Id. at 312–13. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 312. 
 55. Id. 
 56. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 57. Id. at 276–77. 
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the sperm according to the private agreement between the donor and the 
sperm bank.58 
As assets have changed, transformed, or been created, private contracts 
have been the instrument of choice to control the distribution of these assets 
at death.  Today, private contracts play a pivotal role in transferring assets 
upon death, and courts and legislatures have embraced private contracts as a 
valid method of distributing assets.  Courts and legislatures have accepted 
these contracts because the contracts have not been ―repugnant to the 
general policy‖59 of succession law.  These contracts have existed as a tool 
to transfer assets according to the testamentary intent of a decedent.  They 
succeeded because they effectuated a decedent‘s testamentary intent, 
provided much needed flexibility, and ensured quick and efficient transfer. 
Contracts that do not allow transfer of assets, however, threaten the legal 
regime of succession law and should not be upheld by courts and 
legislatures.  Digital assets present a particularly notable and widespread 
example of this threat.  Digital assets follow the familiar pattern of a newly 
developed asset being controlled by private contract, but digital asset 
contracts have veered away from the time-honored, court and legislature–
sanctioned method of transferring assets by prohibiting transfer altogether.  
Although these contracts may be procedurally valid, enforcing them raises 
significant policy concerns, which will be explored in the following parts. 
B.   Growing Importance of Digital Assets 
There has been a phenomenal increase in the use of the internet and 
computers by Americans.  As a result, Americans have created a slew of 
digital assets, which are, for the most part, controlled by private contracts.  
One can only imagine what kinds of new internet services and computer 
programs will be developed in the future, but whatever new kinds of digital 
assets society creates, Americans will want a mechanism for transferring 
them at death.  This section introduces the scope of digital assets controlled 
by private contract and addresses why the question of inheritance is a 
pressing one.  It also gives an overview of how private contracts treat the 
descendibility of digital assets. 
1.   The Importance of Access to Financial Accounts 
The digital age has transformed how we create and store personal 
information.  If current trends of internet usage and storage continue, access 
to digital assets will become critical in order to properly manage an estate 
for an incapacitated or deceased individual. 
Digital assets are increasing as more Americans use the internet every 
day.  In 1995, 14 percent of American adults used the internet.60  Today, 85 
 
 58. Id. at 291.  The court did not address the validity of the contract. 
 59. Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 115, 117 (1815). 
 60. Internet Use Over Time, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/data-
trend/internet-use/internet-use-over-time/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
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percent of American adults use the internet in some way.61  Over half of 
internet users post original photos or videos on websites.62  American 
teenagers lead the way in internet usage with a staggering 95 percent access 
the internet.63  Older Americans have also increased their internet use in the 
last five years.  In 2009, 13 percent of adults over sixty-five years old used 
social networking; today, 43 percent use social networking.64  Over half of 
adults sixty-five years or older use the internet and the majority of older 
American adults who use the internet use email.65  With the dramatic 
increase in internet usage, young and old Americans are creating digital 
assets every moment.  The question about what to do with these assets at 
death is one that is immediate and one that will continue to grow in scope 
and interest as the majority of adults continue creating digital assets. 
Although financial accounts managed online may not truly be considered 
―digital assets‖ because the money transferred via these online accounts is 
arguably physical instead of digital, access to these online accounts is 
important for individuals trying to manage an incapacitated or deceased 
individual‘s estate.  In an economy that is becoming increasingly digital, it 
is likely that there will come a day when it would be impossible for a 
fiduciary to manage another‘s estate without access to the decedent‘s online 
accounts.66  Even now, granting access to online accounts will improve a 
fiduciary‘s efficiency in administrating or managing an estate. 
The increase in internet use makes access to digital financial accounts 
more important for caretakers and family members after the death of a 
loved one.  The number of Americans who bank online is steadily 
increasing.67  Many banks, credit card companies, and brokerage accounts 
offer the ability to receive correspondence and monthly bills electronically 
and deduct payments automatically.  Bank of America has indicated that 
one-third of its checking account and savings account users have signed up 
 
 61. Kathryn Zickuhr, Who‟s Not Online and Why, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 25, 2013), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Non-internet-users.aspx. 
 62. Maeve Duggan, Photo and Video Sharing Grow Online, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 
28, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Photos-and-videos.aspx. 
 63. Internet User Demographics, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
data-trend/teens/internet-user-demographics/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 64. Joanna Brenner & Aaron Smith, 72% of Online Adults Are Social Networking Site 
Users, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/ 
2013/social-networking-sites.aspx. 
 65. Kathryn Zickuhr & Mary Madden, Older Adults and Internet Use, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR. (June 6, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/06/06/older-adults-and-internet-use/. 
 66. To demonstrate the effectiveness of conducting financial transactions online, see 
Carmen Maria Machado, The Afterlife of Pia Farrenkopf, NEW YORKER (Mar. 27, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/currency-tag/the-afterlife-of-pia-farrenkopf (Farrenkopf‘s bills, 
bank notices, and financial accounts were all administered electronically, her death went 
undiscovered for five years, and when her accounts were depleted, the bank foreclosed on 
her house and a contractor discovered her remains in her garage). 
 67. In 2010, 46 percent of American adults banked online.  Today, 51 percent of 
Americans adults bank online. SUSANNAH FOX, PEW RESEARCH CTR., 51% OF U.S. ADULTS 
BANK ONLINE 2 (2013), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media// 
Files/Reports/2013/PIP_OnlineBanking.pdf. 
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for paperless statements.68  Utility providers, phone and internet companies, 
and insurance companies also provide electronic service and financial 
management.  Many utility providers are moving away from mailing paper 
statements to consumers and moving toward conducting all business via the 
phone or internet.69  Service providers that offer electronic statements and 
billing save on printing and postage, and often offer incentives for 
customers to sign up for paperless accounts.70  The Internal Revenue 
Service also has begun to encourage people to file electronic tax returns, 
and in 2012, 80 percent of Americans filed their taxes electronically.71 
Problems accessing email or online financial information make it much 
more difficult for those managing the property of an incapacitated or 
deceased individual.72  Increased lifespan has resulted in many people 
living with decreased mental or physical capacity.73  The aim of estate 
planning is to allow people to plan for how their assets will be managed 
when they are unable to do so themselves.  If they cannot grant a fiduciary 
access to their online accounts, a primary goal of estate planning will be 
threatened.  With a few exceptions, state laws have not kept up with the 
shift to paperless financial administration.74  Executors and attorneys-in-
fact are left floundering as they attempt to manage different policies and 
 
 68. Candice Choi, 3 Things to Watch for with Paperless Statements, NBC NEWS (Apr. 
13, 2011, 4:37 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42576708/#.UqjWUvRDvTo. 
 69. See, e.g., Utility Billing Payment Options, CITY OF MANHATTAN, KAN., 
http://www.ci.manhattan.ks.us/index.aspx?NID=280 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (providing 
customers the option to enroll in an Online Utility Billing and an Automatic Bill Payment 
Plan); Welcome to Utility Services eBill, CITY OF TUSCON, https://www.onlinebiller.com/ 
tucson/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (allowing customers to elect to receive online-bill 
statements and email notifications, and allowing customers the option of turning off paper 
statements). 
 70. Choi, supra note 68 (citing examples from Wells Fargo and a power provider in the 
Northeast that both held sweepstakes to win prizes if customers signed up for paperless 
billing); Caitlin Conran, Save Trees for Earth Day—Go Paperless!, GREEN MOUNTAIN 
ENERGY (Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.greenmountainenergy.com/2014/04/save-trees-for-
earth-day-go-paperless/ (promising to plant 1000 trees if a total of 60,000 customers are 
enrolled in ―Tree Free billing‖ by the end of April 2014); Enroll in Paperless Billing, 
GEORGIA POWER, http://www.georgiapower.com/residential/paperless-promo.cshtml? 
hp=rfy_box4 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (giving customers who switch to paperless billing 
the chance to win a $100 gift card). 
 71. IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, ELECTRONIC FILING 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 16 
(2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/irsob/reports/2013/IRSOB~E-File%20Report% 
202012.pdf. 
 72. See Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 3 (recounting the story of a young college graduate 
who returned home after her mother had died to find that the electricity had been turned off 
because there was no automatic withdrawal set up, no paper statements had been sent, and 
the daughter did not have access to the online account); John Yates, What‟s Your Problem?  
Powerless Despite Power of Attorney, Bank:  Caretaker Wife Can‟t Access Online Account, 
CHI. TRIB., May 26, 2011, at C23. 
 73. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 495; DANAYA C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF 
SUCCESSION:  WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 427 (2013) (―Most people are likely to face a 
period of incapacity as they reach the end of their lives.‖). 
 74. David M. Lenz, Death and Downloads:  The Evolving Law of Fiduciary Access to 
Digital Assets, 23 PROB. L.J. OHIO 2 (2012). 
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contracts of an individual service provider in order to gain access to needed 
information.75 
While it is still possible to manage an estate without access to an 
incapacitated or deceased person‘s online accounts, the ease and efficiency 
of online access cannot be underestimated, especially for accounts that are 
administered solely online.  As we adopt a digital system of financial 
management, we need to ensure that the system provides a method of 
transferring access to online accounts.  The existing practice and scant law 
on this issue is woefully inadequate to address the pressing demands of a 
digital future. 
2.   The Importance of Preserving Value 
As digital assets continue to increase and replace physical records, 
photos, and personal correspondence, there should be a greater demand 
from account holders and their beneficiaries to ensure that digital materials 
are inheritable.76  Digital assets may hold monetary value, which an account 
holder sees as part of her estate, and also may hold emotional and historical 
value to future generations. 
Many of our emails, pictures, or videos stored online would not be of 
much economic worth.  Most Americans, however, believe that their digital 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. With the increased attention on digital assets, estate planners are beginning to 
counsel testators to plan for their digital assets.  Estate planners encourage testators, among 
other things, to back-up digital materials on an external drive and grant explicit permission 
through a will or a trust for family members to access online accounts. Gerry W. Beyer & 
Naomi Cahn, When You Pass On, Don‟t Leave the Passwords Behind:  Planning for Digital 
Assets, 26 PROB. & PROP. 40 (2012); Nancy Anderson, You Just Locked Out Your Executor 
and Made Your Estate Planning a Monumental Hassle, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/financialfinesse/2012/10/18/you-just-locked-out-your-executor-
and-made-your-estate-planning-a-monumental-hassle/; Tracy Sears, Facebook Sends Family 
Information About Son‟s Page Before His Suicide, WTVR.COM (Apr. 19, 2012, 8:27 AM), 
http://wtvr.com/2011/11/04/facebook-sends-family-information-about-sons-page-before-his-
suicide/; see also Steve Eder, Deaths Pose Test for Facebook, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2012, at 
A3.  Online services have sprung up to address the risk of information being out of date, but 
none has legally recognized powers to control individual assets and it is possible that the 
companies may go out of business before a user needs the service. See, e.g., ASSETLOCK, 
http://www.assetlock.net/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); DEAD MAN‘S SWITCH, 
http://www.deadmansswitch.net/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); IF I DIE, http://ifidie.org/ (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2014); PASSWORDBOX, http://blog.passwordbox.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 
2014).  In addition, online services that attempt to distribute assets have questionable legal 
validity and are likely invalid under the wills acts of most states.  In every state except 
Nevada, a valid will is still required to be in writing on paper or some other tangible medium 
and signed by a testator. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (2010).  Nevada‘s electronic will 
statute requires the use of a testator‘s electronic signature. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 133.085(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2012).  Some states and the Uniform Probate Code allow a 
signature to be made by another if the signature is made in the testator‘s conscious presence 
and by the testator‘s direction. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a).  Electronic documents 
have not been welcome in the field of wills, trusts, and estates.  Although many legal 
documents and pleadings are accepted electronically in the court system today, every state 
but one prohibits the use of electronic wills. NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085; Gerry W. Beyer & 
Claire G. Hargrove, Digital Wills:  Has the Time Come for Wills to Join the Digital 
Revolution?, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 865, 887 (2007). 
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assets hold a significant monetary value,77 and may wish to pass on that 
value to their beneficiaries.  The monetary value of emails, pictures, or 
videos could increase, of course, depending on to whom they belonged.  
Emails and photos stored on the online accounts of the rich and famous 
could easily be sold for large profits.78  Before Congress passed the 
Presidential Records and Materials Preservation Act,79 for example, the 
correspondence and documents of the president and his staff (most of which 
would be stored digitally in today‘s world) were regularly sold to Congress 
for large sums.80  Despite the Act, presidents continue to make money off 
of these papers and other documents in personal presidential libraries.81  It 
is possible that a decedent‘s emails, photos, and other personal information 
stored online could be of great financial value to a decedent‘s beneficiaries. 
As business shifts online, more personal webpages, blogs, and online 
accounts hold monetary value.  Domain names, for example, can be worth 
millions of dollars.82  Blogs have also found a way to generate income.  
According to Forbes, some 13.2 million women bloggers receive some sort 
of profit from their blogs,83 ranging from free products to a trip to Hawaii 
or a monthly stipend.84  Even social networking sites can generate income 
for an account holder.  A ―Twitter party,‖ where a host invites followers to 
tweet about a product for one hour, can earn a host anywhere from $750 to 
$5,000, depending on the number of participants.85  Profit generated from 
these sites is dependent on viewership and the number of people who click 
on advertisements.86  It takes time and effort to build a profitable 
 
 77. According to a McAfee survey conducted in 2011, the average American valued her 
digital assets at $54,722. McAfee Reveals Average Internet User Has More than $37,000 in 
Unprotected „Digital Assets,‟ MCAFEE (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/ 
news/2011/q3/20110927-01.aspx (including photos, projects, hobbies, personal records, 
career information, entertainment, and email). 
 78. Just one of Marilyn Monroe‘s letters was sold at auction for $52,460 in 2011. See 
Lauren Guzniczak, Marilyn Monroe Letter Appraised at $52,460, VALUE MY STUFF, 
http://www.valuemystuff.com/en/news/news-archive/marilyn-monroe-letter-appraised-at-
52460 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).  Imagine how valuable access to her email account would 
have been. 
 79. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3315–3324 (2012). 
 80. Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (―Congress routinely 
bargained for and purchased presidential papers for ‗fancy sums.‘‖).  Washington‘s papers 
sold for $25,000, Madison‘s for $25,000, Monroe‘s for $20,000, Jackson‘s for $18,000, and 
Arthur‘s for $7,500. Id. at 1282–83. 
 81. Id. at 1279 (―[T]he reality is that Presidents have been able to use real leverage in 
negotiating with respect to the disposition of presidential papers to extract from the United 
States ‗fancy sums‘ in the form of lucrative library deals, while maintaining essential control 
over the materials.‖). 
 82. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (―[D]omain names are 
valued, bought and sold, often for millions of dollars . . . .‖). 
 83. Larissa Faw, Is Blogging Really a Way for Women to Earn a Living?, FORBES (Apr. 
25, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larissafaw/2012/04/25/is-blogging-really-a-way-for-
women-to-earn-a-living-2/. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Lisa LaMotta, How to Make Money Online, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2007), 
http://www.forbes.com/2007/11/09/microsoft-yahoo-coke-ent-tech-
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viewership.87  An account holder may be interested in transferring the 
income stream to her beneficiaries by continuing her website and retaining 
her established viewership. 
Loyalty programs also could be considered a form of digital asset and are 
controlled by private contracts.  Loyalty programs give customers who are 
loyal to certain service providers or retail stores ―points‖ or ―miles.‖  These 
points or miles can then be redeemed for free flights, merchandise, or nights 
at resorts.88  It has been reported that two-thirds of Americans collect 
reward miles and points for travel, and 25 percent let miles expire.89  
Frequent flyer miles, retail store shopping points, or hotel reward programs 
have economic value and some individuals may have rewards worth 
thousands of dollars.90  The Economist has dubbed frequent flyer miles ―a 
new international currency‖ and perhaps ―the world‘s second-biggest 
currency after the dollar.‖91  According to The Economist, ―In a recent poll 
of frequent travellers, two-thirds said that they see frequent flyer miles as 
the next best thing to actual cash:  almost half even thought they should 
earn interest on their accounts.‖92  Organizations such as the Red Cross and 
the Make-A-Wish Foundation have tapped into that economic value, 
encouraging people to donate their frequent flyer miles.93  As reward 
programs continue to increase in value and are used more widely, it is likely 
that public demand to devise these assets will increase.94 
 
cx_ll_1108makemoneyonline.html (stating that websites need to have a viewership of 
500,000 visitors per month in order to attract large advertisers). 
 87. See generally Faw, supra note 83. 
 88. Xavier Dreze & Joseph C. Nunes, Using Combined-Currency Prices to Lower 
Consumers‟ Perceived Cost, 41 J. MKTG. RES. 59, 59–60 (2004) (tracing the rise and 
implication of loyalty programs); Knowledge@Wharton, The Lowdown on Customer 
Loyalty Programs, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2007, 2:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/ 
01/02/frequent-flyer-miles-ent-sales-cx_kw_0102whartonloyalty.html (explaining that 
loyalty programs have been around for more than 100 years and more than 75 percent of 
consumers today have at least one loyalty card). 
 89. Genevieve Shaw Brown, Unused Frequent-Flier Miles „Hidden Treasure‟ for 
Passengers, ABC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/unused-frequent-
flier-miles-hidden-treasure-passengers/story?id=18922409. 
 90. Susan Stellin, Bequeathing Your Unused Miles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2012, at TR3. 
 91. Frequent Flyer Economics, ECONOMIST, May 4, 2002, at 15. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Jamie Lisse, How to Donate Frequent Flyer Miles, USA TODAY, 
http://traveltips.usatoday.com/donate-frequent-flyer-miles-1668.html (last visited Oct. 19, 
2014). 
 94. Several online programs have sprung up to assist customers in keeping track and 
using their rewards.  As of February 27, 2014, the following websites were active and aimed 
to help customers manage reward points and programs:  https://www.points.com/; 
http://awardwallet.com/; https://www.traxo.com/; https://www.miletracker.com/; and 
https://www.usingmiles.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).  Bloggers already follow which 
airlines allow account holders to devise frequent flyer miles. See AIRFAREWATCHDOG, 
http://www.airfarewatchdog.com/blog/15509513/yes-you-can-inherit-frequent-flyer-miles/ 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2014); Gary Stoller, What Happens to Frequent-Flier Miles If you Die?, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 1, 2013, 6:03 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/ 
flights/2013/09/01/deceased-travelers-frequent-flier-points/2749761/ (citing examples of 
people trying to devise reward points). 
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Even if digital assets hold no monetary value, they can hold emotional 
value to a decedent‘s friends and family.  Because so much of our lives are 
played out online, our online accounts give invaluable information about 
our interests, personalities, and desires to those we leave behind.  People 
increasingly seek comfort after a loved one‘s death from their online 
presence.95  Digital assets have replaced, and will continue to replace, 
sentimental assets like letters, scrapbooks, home videos, and shoeboxes full 
of photos, which all carry great emotional significance to a bereaved family 
and historical significance to society.96  As of now, many digital assets are 
subject to deletion upon the death of an account holder.97  If nothing is 
changed, digital assets of all kinds will be lost to future generations. 
Despite the fact that digital assets hold emotional and financial value, 
which account holders may wish to transfer to their beneficiaries,98 
contracts controlling digital assets may severely limit an account holder‘s 
ability to do so.  The next section discusses how digital asset contracts 
commonly treat the descendibility of digital assets. 
C.   Exploring Digital Assets‟ Contractual Terms 
As we have seen, although email, social networking sites, and loyalty 
programs are commonly seen as ―belonging‖ to an account holder,99 they 
are actually controlled by contracts between a service provider and an 
account holder.  The terms of service agreement for digital accounts are as 
varied as the type of accounts themselves, but most address issues that 
control a decedent‘s ability to transfer assets upon his or her death.100  
Some companies address the transfer of assets in policy supplements that 
are not actually part of the terms of service agreement.101  In most cases, 
 
 95. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Life and Death Online:  Who Controls a Digital Legacy?, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 5. 2013, at A1; Fredrick Kunkle, Virginia Family, Seeking Clues to Son‟s 




 96. Deven R. Desai, Property, Persona, and Preservation, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 67, 75, 93 
(2008) (―With much of our expression and identity constructed in the digital world, not 
paying attention to the administration of this information will result in valuable resources 
being lost to the vagaries of inconsistent service provider policies . . . .  [H]istorians‘ 
interests in preservation of these materials is a subset of society‘s general interest, for in both 
cases the artifacts are the very building blocks of future understanding, creativity, and 
production.‖). 
 97. See, e.g., Yahoo Terms of Service, YAHOO!, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/ 
yahoo/utos/en-us/ (last updated March 16, 2012) (―Upon receipt of a copy of a death 
certificate, your account may be terminated and all contents therein permanently deleted.‖). 
 98. For further discussion of the value of digital assets to beneficiaries, see infra Part 
III.C. 
 99. Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns a Decedent‟s Emails:  
Inheritable Probate Assets or Property of the Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL‘Y 
281, 313 (2007); see also People v. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d 468, 473 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (―E-mail 
is ‗comparable in principle to sending a first class letter . . . .‘‖ (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 
F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996))). 
 100. See infra notes 102–16 and accompanying text. 
 101. See infra notes 109–13 and accompanying text. 
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however, this is irrelevant because an account holder agrees in the terms 
and services agreement to a company‘s policy supplements.  Through 
private contracts, internet service providers determine if an asset is 
descendible and how it is distributed without direction from an account 
holder. 
Terms of service agreements or company policies follow one of four 
general approaches to transferability of digital assets at death:  (1) the 
contractual term or policy expressly prohibits account transferability upon 
death or transferability in general;102 (2) the term or policy generally 
prohibits transfer but allows transferability with permission from the service 
provider;103 (3) the term or policy expressly allows transferability upon 
death with certain proof;104 or (4) the term or policy is silent on whether an 
account can be transferred upon death.105 
 
 102. See Microsoft Services Agreement, MICROSOFT, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-
us/windows-live/microsoft-services-agreement (last updated June 11, 2014) (―We may 
assign this Agreement, in whole or in part, at any time without notice to you.  You may not 
assign this Agreement or transfer any rights to use the Services.‖); Terms of Service, 
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (―Twitter gives you a personal, 
worldwide, royalty-free, non-assignable and non-exclusive license to use the software that is 
provided to you by Twitter as part of the Services.‖); Yahoo Terms of Service, supra note 97 
(―No Right of Survivorship and Non-Transferability.  You agree that your Yahoo account is 
non-transferable and any rights to your Yahoo ID or contents within your account terminate 
upon your death.  Upon receipt of a copy of a death certificate, your account may be 
terminated and all contents therein permanently deleted.‖). 
 103. DELTA, ALL ABOUT SKYMILES:  SKYMILES MEMBERSHIP GUIDE 30 (2014), available 
at http://www.delta.com/content/dam/delta-www/pdfs/skymiles/SM_MemGuide.pdf (―Miles 
are not the property of any member.  Except as specifically authorized in the Membership 
Guide and Program Rules or otherwise in writing by an officer of Delta, miles may not be 
sold, attached, seized, levied upon, pledged, or transferred under any circumstances, 
including, without limitation, by operation of law, upon death, or in connection with any 
domestic relations dispute and/or legal proceeding.‖); MileagePlus Rules, UNITED AIRLINES, 
http://www.united.com//web/en-US/content/mileageplus/rules/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 
19, 2014) (―Accrued mileage and certificates do not constitute property of the member and 
are not transferable other than as authorized and/or sponsored by United.‖); Statement of 
Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2014) (―You will not transfer your account (including any Page or application you 
administer) to anyone without first getting our written permission.‖). 
 104. IHG Rewards Club Global Membership Terms and Conditions, INTERCONTINENTAL 
HOTELS GRP., http://www.ihg.com/hotels/us/en/global/customer_care/member-tc (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2014) (―When an IHG® Rewards Club member passes away, the member‘s IHG® 
Rewards Club points may be transferred to the IHG® Rewards Club account(s) of the 
member‘s beneficiary(ies).‖).  Marriott allows transfer to a spouse or domestic partner only.  
It does not allow points to be inherited by any other person. Rewards Terms & Conditions, 
MARRIOTT, http://www.marriott.com/rewards/terms/default.mi (last updated May 1, 2014) 
(―Accrued Points and Miles do not constitute property of the Member.  Points accrued by a 
Rewards Program Member are for the Member‘s benefit only and may not be transferred to 
anyone except as provided below.  Points are transferable to a legal spouse or domestic 
partner in the case of documented death of the Member . . . .  Points are not transferable to 
another person for any other reason, including divorce or inheritance.‖). 
 105. Stellin, supra note 90 (noting that JetBlue and United do not have clear policies).  
Dropbox‘s terms are silent on whether an account can be transferred to another user. 
Dropbox Terms of Service, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/privacy#terms (last updated 
Feb. 20, 2014).  Google‘s term of service agreement does not address transferability.  It does 
provide a method to petition for access to the email account. Accessing a Deceased Person‟s 
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In addition to the four direct approaches above, some agreements include 
terms that could also be interpreted to limit transfer of assets at death.  For 
example, some terms of service agreements allow a service provider to 
terminate an account at any time for any reason, which could be used to 
justify policies that prohibit transfer at death.106  Such a clause could be 
used to terminate an account of a deceased user whether or not a user 
wanted to devise his account.  Others state that a provider will only 
terminate an account if a user violates the agreement.107  For those 
agreements that prohibit transfer of an account, it is possible that attempting 
to devise an account at death could result in a provider terminating the 
account. 
Account agreements also usually preserve a company‘s ability to access 
individual accounts according to the law.108  Terms of service agreements 
may prohibit account holders from granting access or revealing their 
password to anyone else.109  In addition, account agreements usually choose 
which state‘s law will apply to disputes about an account.110  Because state 
 
Account, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/ 
2842525?hl=en&ref_topic=3075532 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 106. See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/ 
terms/ (last updated Apr. 14, 2014) (―Google may also stop providing Services to you, or add 
or create new limits to our Services at any time.‖); Yahoo Terms of Service, supra note 97 
(―[A]ll terminations, limitations of access and suspensions for cause shall be made in 
Yahoo‘s sole discretion and . . . Yahoo shall not be liable to you or any third party for any 
termination of your account . . . .‖); Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2014) (―We may suspend or terminate your accounts or cease providing you 
with all or part of the Services at any time and for any reason . . . .‖). 
 107. Microsoft Services Agreement, supra note 102 (―If you violate this agreement, we 
may take action against you including (without limitation) removing your content from the 
services, suspending your access to the services, asking you to refrain from certain activities, 
canceling your services, and/or referring such activity to appropriate authorities.‖); 
MileagePlus Rules, supra note 103 (―Any failure to follow Program Rules, United‘s contract 
of carriage, United‘s fare rules, any abuse of Program privileges, any violation of law, rule 
or regulation, . . . may result in the termination by United of such member‘s 
membership . . . .‖). 
 108. See, e.g., Microsoft Services Agreement, supra note 102 (―Similar to other providers 
of Internet services, Microsoft is served with legal demands and requests from law 
enforcement, government entities, and private litigants for content stored on our network.  
This information may relate to an alleged crime or civil matter and is usually requested 
pursuant to the normal legal process of the country or locality where the activity occurred.  
Microsoft may be obligated to comply with requests for your information or your content as 
part of such investigations or legal proceedings.‖). 
 109. See, e.g., Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 103 (―You will not 
share your password (or in the case of developers, your secret key), let anyone else access 
your account, or do anything else that might jeopardize the security of your account.‖). 
 110. See, e.g., Google Terms of Service, supra note 106 (―The laws of California, U.S.A., 
excluding California‘s conflict of laws rules, will apply to any disputes arising out of or 
relating to these terms or the Services.‖); Microsoft Services Agreement, supra note 102 
(―The laws of the state where you live govern the interpretation of this Agreement, claims 
for breach of it, and all other claims . . . .‖); Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra 
note 103 (―The laws of the State of California will govern this Statement, as well as any 
claim that might arise between you and us, without regard to conflict of law provisions.‖); 
Yahoo Terms of Service, supra note 97 (―You and Yahoo each agree that the TOS and the 
relationship between the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of California 
without regard to its conflict of law provisions . . . .‖). 
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law controls most property transfers upon death, the choice of law provision 
in a terms of service agreement could be a determinative factor as to 
whether the assets are capable of transfer. 
Even if the contract has a term that could be interpreted to prohibit the 
transfer of an account to an estate, some service providers have more 
lenient policies outside of their contractual terms.  Microsoft, for example, 
states in its Terms of Service Agreement that an account may not be 
transferred.111  According to a Microsoft forum, however, Microsoft does 
allow the ―Next of Kin‖ to obtain the contents of an Outlook.com 
account.112  This policy is not memorialized in any of the contract terms 
between a user and Microsoft and could be changed or revoked at any time. 
By agreeing to use the service, account holders bind themselves to the 
contractual terms and policies of the service provider.  Service providers are 
free to change or update their policies regarding whether the assets are 
descendible at any time.  Frequent flyer reward programs are a good 
example of an asset completely controlled by a company through contract.  
Although one can donate frequent flyer miles during life, after death many 
airlines prohibit an individual from devising her miles to her beneficiaries.  
Delta,113 Southwest,114 JetBlue,115 and United116 all have policies that 
prohibit miles from being transferred upon the death of an account holder.  
Even if an airline allows transfer, there is no guarantee that the airline will 
allow transfer in the future.  Prior to March 2013, for example, Delta 
allowed transfer of a deceased member‘s miles as long as an executor 
provided an affidavit and a copy of the deceased member‘s death 
 
 111. Microsoft Services Agreement, supra note 102 (―We may assign this Agreement, in 
whole or in part, at any time without notice to you.  You may not assign this Agreement or 
transfer any rights to use the Services.‖). 
 112. My Family Member Died Recently/ Is in Coma, What Do I Need to Do to Access 
Their Microsoft Account?, MICROSOFT COMMUNITY (Mar. 15, 2012), 
http://answers.microsoft.com/en-us/outlook_com/forum/oaccount-omyinfo/my-family-
member-died-recently-is-in-coma-what-do/308cedce-5444-4185-82e8-0623ecc1d3d6 (―The 
Microsoft Next of Kin process allows for the release of Outlook.com contents, including all 
emails and their attachments, address book, and Messenger contact list, to the next of kin of 
a deceased or incapacitated account holder and/or closure of the Microsoft account, 
following a short authentication process.  We cannot provide you with the password to the 
account or change the password on the account, and we cannot transfer ownership of the 
account to the next of kin.  Account contents are released by way of a data DVD which is 
shipped to you.‖). 
 113. DELTA, supra note 103. 
 114. Program Terms and Conditions, SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, 
http://www.southwest.com/html/customer-service/faqs.html?topic=rapid_rewards_program 
_terms_and_conditions (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (―A Member has the ability to transfer 
Rapid Rewards Points to another Member with an active Rapid Rewards account.  However, 
points may not be transferred to a Member‘s estate or as part of a settlement.‖). 
 115. TrueBlue Terms and Conditions, JETBLUE, https://trueblue.jetblue.com/web/ 
trueblue/terms-and-conditions (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (―Points are non-transferable and 
may not be combined among TrueBlue Members, their estates, successors and assigns.  
Accrued Points and Award Travel do not constitute property of Member and are non-
transferable (i) upon death, (ii) as part of a domestic relations matter, or (iii) otherwise.‖). 
 116. MileagePlus Rules, supra note 103 (―Accrued mileage and certificates do not 
constitute property of the member and are not transferable other than as authorized and/or 
sponsored by United.‖). 
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certificate.117  Without notice to its members, Delta changed the policy in 
its Sky Miles policy book by stating that miles may not be ―transferred 
under any circumstances, including, without limitation, by operation of law, 
upon death, or in connection with any domestic relations dispute and/or 
legal proceeding.‖118  Delta received some negative press and angry 
members signed a petition to protest the policy change, but the policy 
remains unchanged.119  The airlines, not the member, determine how assets 
accumulated during a member‘s life are distributed at a member‘s death and 
can change their policies regarding distribution at any time and without 
notice to their members. 
There may be little protection that state contract law can offer those who 
are mistreated by airlines.  The Supreme Court recently held that a state‘s 
implied covenant rules (including the obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing) are preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act120 (ADA).121  In 
Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 122 an airline terminated a member‘s frequent 
flyer membership.  The member claimed that the airline breached the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.123  The airline argued that its 
frequent flyer program was not subject to the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing because state common law rules and regulations are preempted 
by the ADA.124  The Court held that state common law rules as well as state 
regulation fall under the purview of the ADA preemption provision,125 and 
that the frequent flyer program related to rates, routes, and services of an air 
carrier under the ADA.126  The Court held that by establishing frequent 
flyer programs, airlines do not subject themselves to state contract law or to 
the requirement of good faith and fair dealing if the requirement is a state-
imposed obligation rather than a contractual choice.127 
Although the Court did not address succession rules, under the precedent 
of Ginsberg, it is unlikely that beneficiaries will be successful in 
challenging or enforcing airline policies that deny inheritance rights of 
 
 117. John Ollila, Delta‟s Policy Change About Death & SkyMiles, LOYALTYLOBBY (Mar. 
21, 2013), http://loyaltylobby.com/2013/03/21/deltas-policy-change-about-death-skymiles/. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Haley Peterson, Delta Angers Frequent Fliers by Banning Them from Transferring 
Miles to Family Members and Friends After Death, MAIL ONLINE (Mar. 26, 2013), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2300104/Delta-angers-frequent-fliers-banning-
transferring-miles-family-members-friends-death.html. 
 120. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.). 
 121. Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1426 (2014). 
 122. Id. at 1422. 
 123. Id. at 1427. 
 124. Id. at 1431. 
 125. Id. at 1429. 
 126. Id. at 1431. 
 127. Id. at 1432.  Previously, in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222, 
227–229 (1995), the Supreme Court held that the ADA preempted a consumer protection 
claim because the Act tried to enforce law regulating the marketing practices of airlines.  The 
Supreme Court found that the breach of contract claim could go forward because the contract 
created duties and responsibilities that were self-imposed and not required by the state, and 
left the door open for ―court enforcement of contract terms set by the parties themselves.‖ Id. 
at 222. 
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rewards and miles under the principles of state succession or contract law.  
Succession law, like contract law, is formed at the state level.  Under the 
ADA and Supreme Court precedent, Congress must now act in order to 
protect the rights of succession of frequent flyer miles.  As the Supreme 
Court noted, Congress has authorized the Department of Transportation to 
investigate unfair and deceptive practices in air transportation.128  In 
addition, the Court noted that the free market might limit unfair practices by 
encouraging loyal customers to enroll in competing airline loyalty 
programs.129  Nevertheless, it is likely after Ginsberg that state contract and 
succession laws attempting to control frequent flyer programs will be 
preempted under the ADA. 
Thus, although service provider contracts treat the issue of digital asset 
inheritance differently, most are written to allow a service provider wide 
latitude in determining if digital assets are descendible and how they are to 
be distributed.  In addition, the service agreements and policies of a service 
provider can change without notice to account holders.  Even if an asset was 
originally devisable, there is no guarantee that it will still be devisable at an 
account holder‘s death.  The provisions drafted by a service provider, not an 
account holder, reign in determining how digital assets are treated after an 
account holder‘s death.  Account holders must exclusively rely on service 
providers‘ good will in allowing any transfer of their assets at death. 
D.   Forming Digital Asset Contracts 
Courts have not addressed whether provisions barring or significantly 
limiting the descendibility of digital assets are enforceable, but, under 
contract formation principles, it is unlikely that courts would strike down 
digital asset contracts.  Form contracts, like the ones used to govern most 
digital assets, are widespread in our system today and usually upheld.130  In 
order for a digital contract to be validly formed, the terms must be 
reasonably communicated to a user and a user must manifest assent to the 
agreement.131 
When a user creates an account or enrolls in a service online, a service 
provider usually requires its users to execute what is known as an internet 
―clickwrap‖ or ―browsewrap‖ agreement.132  A clickwrap agreement 
requires users to click on a dialogue box indicating consent to the terms and 
conditions of the account or program.133  If a user does not click on the 
dialogue box indicating consent, a user is unable to continue opening an 
account or using the service.134  Unlike a clickwrap agreement, a 
 
 128. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1433. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE 8–15 (2012) (giving an 
overview of the ―world‖ of contracts, in which standardized form contracts are prevalent). 
 131. Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 611 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (collecting 
cases). 
 132. Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 133. Jallali v. Nat‘l Bd. of Osteopathic Med. Exam‘rs, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 1168, 1173 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2009). 
 134. Id. 
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browsewrap agreement is displayed to a user but does not require a user to 
click on a dialogue box before continuing with the service.135 
Courts have generally found that clickwrap agreements are enforceable, 
meaning that they reasonably communicate the terms of an agreement to a 
user and that users manifest assent by clicking some kind of dialogue box to 
continue using the program.136  Browsewrap agreements can also be 
enforced if a user has actual or constructive knowledge of the terms and 
conditions of the service, but courts view browsewrap agreements less 
favorably.137  For example, in the only published case where an executor 
sought access to a decedent‘s email account, Ajemian v. Yahoo! Inc.,138 the 
agreement at issue was akin to a browsewrap agreement instead of a 
clickwrap agreement.  The court found that it could not infer that the 
provisions of the contract ―were displayed on the user‘s computer screen (in 
whole or in part).‖139  In addition, the court did not find that the terms were 
reasonably accepted because there was no place for the user to ―click[] ‗I 
accept‘ or . . . tak[e] some similar action.‖140  Perhaps courts will continue 
to view browsewrap agreements with more skepticism because a user never 
affirmatively agrees to the terms of use. 
Even if the contracts are formed properly under contract law, contracts 
entered into by an individual with an online service provider do not allow 
an individual‘s testamentary intent to rule the distribution of assets.  The 
contracts are not negotiated, the terms concerning inheritance are not clear 
and conspicuous, and there is little alternative choice for users.  Most digital 
asset contracts are offered in a take-it-or-leave-it fashion, with no room for 
negotiation or place to indicate testamentary intent.  An individual must 
agree to the terms of service agreement in order to continue enrolling in the 
program, using the service, or purchasing the asset.  It is unclear whether 
people realize that by using an email service or buying a digital copy of a 
movie that they are relinquishing their right to transfer those assets at death 
due to constraints placed upon them under contract.  Even if people 
understood that they were relinquishing power over their assets at death, it 
is unclear whether the market provides a real choice to use a different 
internet service provider that allows descendibility.141  The lack of an 
alternative choice undermines any real control account holders have over 
 
 135. Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 236 n.1. 
 136. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc‘ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28–30 (2d Cir. 2002); 
TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Pak China Grp. Co. Ltd., 843 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (S.D. Fla. 2012); 
Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 236; Jallali, 908 N.E. 2d at 1173 (citing Adsit Co., Inc. v. 
Gustin, 874 N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 
732 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 
S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). 
 137. Molnar v. 1-800-Flowers.com, No. CV 08-0542 CAS (JCx), 2008 WL 4772125, at 
*7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008); Sw. Airlines v. Boardfirst, LLC, No. 3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 
WL 4823761, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007); Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 
974, 982 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 
 138. 987 N.E.2d 604 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013). 
 139. Id. at 612. 
 140. Id. at 613. 
 141. For more discussion of market pressures, see infra Part III.A. 
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their digital assets.  In order to create digital assets, one must agree to the 
terms of the digital asset contracts.  As such, as digital assets become more 
pervasive in everyday life, our very conception of what it means to own 
something may shift due to clauses in contracts that control our 
communications, finances, and entertainment.142 
Although a court may find a digital asset contract invalid due to problems 
with contract formation, issues with contract formation can be fixed by 
making contractual language more conspicuous so that there is a showing of 
reasonable communication and assent.  The more substantive problem lies 
in what the contracts are trying to do, not how they are formed.143  Even if 
private contracts between service providers and users are valid, terms that 
deny inheritance should be void as a matter of public policy. 
II.   PROMOTING DIGITAL ASSET INHERITANCE THROUGH PUBLIC POLICY 
Private contracts may be a time-honored tool to transfer assets at death, 
but most contracts controlling digital assets differ from other private 
agreements or nonprobate transfers in two related ways.  First, private 
agreements controlling digital assets are the first widespread contracts to 
prohibit transfer of personal property instead of facilitating it.  Second, the 
terms of transfer are usually not controlled by the testamentary intent of an 
account holder but by a service provider‘s policies.  Through these contracts 
and policies, service providers make decisions that are traditionally left to a 
testator.144 
This part argues that even if digital asset contracts are procedurally valid, 
terms that prohibit inheritability should be void as a matter of public policy.  
Contracts that prohibit or control descendibility fundamentally alter 
American succession law.  Digital asset contracts illustrate the danger of 
allowing companies to direct how assets are handled after death in 
accordance with companies‘ wishes and desires.  This part then 
demonstrates that the current response of state legislatures and courts reflect 
the concern that denying inheritance is against public policy.  Lastly, this 
 
 142. See discussion infra Part II.A–B. 
 143. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057–58 (Mass. 2000) (―With this said, we 
conclude that, even had the husband and the wife entered into an unambiguous agreement 
between themselves regarding the disposition of their frozen preembryos, we would not 
enforce an agreement that would compel one donor to become a parent against his or her 
will . . . .  It is well established that courts will not enforce contracts that violate public 
policy.‖). 
 144. In our system of succession, the testamentary intent of a testator (manifested in a 
will, trust, or other written instrument) controls how property is distributed. See Shapira v. 
Union Nat‘l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Ohio Misc. 1974) (―Whether this judgment was 
wise is not for this court to determine.  But it is the duty of this court to honor the testator‘s 
intention within the limitations of law and of public policy.‖); In re Glavkee‘s Estate, 34 
N.W.2d 300, 305 (N.D. 1948) (―[T]he cardinal rule of testamentary construction is to 
ascertain the intention of the testator and give it effect.‖); Harkey v. Neville, 49 S.E. 218, 
219 (S.C. 1904) (citing ―the well-settled rule of law in the construction of wills that the 
intention of the testator is to be obtained from his own words‖).  If a testator has not 
manifested intent, courts apply the presumed intent of a testator through intestacy provisions 
created by state legislatures. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 63. 
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part analyzes potential reasons why companies have taken such a dramatic 
turn in limiting private contract inheritance and argues that there is no 
justifiable reason for service providers to deny digital assets from being 
transferred at death according to the testamentary intent of an account 
holder. 
A.   Altering Succession Law 
Private contracts that control the administration of financial accounts are 
aimed at distributing assets.  They ensure that the transfer of assets is 
unimpeded, occurring without lengthy delay or undue cost.  As we have 
seen, new contracts are emerging that either deny transfer altogether or, if 
they allow transfer, only do so according to the discretion of a service 
provider.  These contracts challenge the policies that underpin our system 
of property succession. 
As a general matter, the common law has long disfavored any restraints 
on alienability of property as a matter of policy.145  One of the most 
embedded rights in the American subconscious is the freedom to distribute 
property as we see fit at our death.146  The American freedom of disposition 
grants us the satisfaction of having power over our belongings after we 
die.147  The Restatement (Third) of Property states, ―The organizing 
principle of the American law of donative transfers is freedom of 
disposition.  Property owners have the nearly unrestricted right to dispose 
of their property as they please.‖148  This principle has guided courts‘ 
interpretation of wills, trusts, and intestacy statutes throughout the history 
of our nation.  How the principle of freedom of disposition applies to 
private contracts that limit this freedom is the central problem facing 
American succession law. 
Although courts have not considered a challenge to private contracts 
denying inheritance, the Supreme Court has considered federal legislation 
that denied inheritance.  In 1983, Congress passed a law that prohibited the 
devise or inheritance of small fractional shares of land allotted to Native 
Americans.  Several years after the legislation was passed, the Supreme 
Court found that the statute was a taking that required just compensation.149  
In determining whether a taking occurred, the Court considered two 
factors.150  First, the Court characterized the right to pass on property as 
 
 145. White v. Brown, 559 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tenn. 1977) (―[The decedent‘s] attempted 
restraint on alienation must be declared void as inconsistent with the incidents and nature of 
the estate devised and contrary to public policy.‖); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 
§ 4.1 (1983) (―A disabling restraint imposed in a donative transfer on an interest in property 
is invalid if the restraint, if effective, would make it impossible for any period of time from 
the date of the donative transfer to transfer such interest.‖). 
 146. MADOFF, supra note 4, at 57. 
 147. See Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 
68 IND. L.J. 1, 6–14 (1992) (describing traditional justifications for freedom of testation). 
 148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:  WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 10.1 cmt. a (2003). 
 149. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).  The challenged statute was § 207 of the 
Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. 97-459, tit. II, 96 Stat. 2519. 
 150. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 715–17. 
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―one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property.‖151  It established that the ―right to pass on 
valuable property to one‘s heirs is itself a valuable right,‖152 which ―has 
been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times.‖153  
Second, the Court found that the statute completely abrogated the right to 
pass on property.154  The Court found that ―[e]ven the United States 
concedes that total abrogation of the right to pass property is unprecedented 
and likely unconstitutional‖155 and that ―abolishing both descent and 
devise‖ of an asset was an ―extraordinary step.‖156 
Contracts controlling digital assets take the extraordinary, unprecedented 
step of abrogating the right to pass property at death.  If nothing is done, 
corporations will be able to infringe upon a valuable right that has been part 
of our system since feudal times157 and change the very core of American 
succession law by declaring digital assets unable to be devised and a 
decedent‘s intent to be irrelevant.  By prohibiting assets from being devised, 
service providers change the nature of our ownership rights over digital 
assets.  Digital asset contracts treat digital assets more like a licensed good, 
where consumers only have power over the assets as granted by an 
agreement.158  Again, it is the corporation that decides what ownership 
interest we have in our digital assets.  Through the terms of agreements, we 
acquiesce to their formulation of our interests in our emails, social media, 
frequent flyer miles, and other digital assets. 
Contracts that prohibit the transfer of digital assets and contracts that 
allow transfer at the discretion of a corporation are also changing American 
succession law by ignoring the testamentary intent of a decedent in 
distributing her assets.  Even contracts that allow transfer may only allow 
transfer in the discretion of a company, completely ignoring the intention of 
a decedent.  American succession law has always held that the intention of a 
testator is the paramount concern in distributing her assets.  The 
Restatement (Third) of Property states that ―[t]he controlling consideration 
in determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor‘s 
intention,‖159 and ―[t]he donor‘s intention is given effect to the maximum 
 
 151. Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
 152. Id. at 715. 
 153. Id. at 716. 
 154. Id. at 717 (―The difference in this case is the fact that both descent and devise are 
completely abolished.‖). 
 155. Id. at 716. 
 156. Id. at 718. 
 157. See id. 
 158. For example, Apple licenses the use of iTunes software to users.  According to the 
license agreement, Apple has full control over the transfer of the software. See Licensed 
Application End User License Agreement, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-
services/itunes/appstore/dev/stdeula/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (―You may not rent, lease, 
lend, sell, redistribute or sublicense the Licensed Application. . . .  You agree not to modify, 
rent, lease, loan, sell, distribute, or create derivative works based on the Services, in any 
manner, and You shall not exploit the Services in any unauthorized way whatsoever, 
including but not limited to, by trespass or burdening network capacity.‖). 
 159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:  WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 10.1 (2003). 
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extent allowed by law.‖160  Whether the transfer occurs via a will or a 
private agreement, the aim of the instrument and of the transfer is to 
distribute assets in accordance with a decedent‘s intent.  Courts invoke this 
principle as a rule of construction when asked to interpret provisions of a 
will,161 and legislatures have codified the principle to ensure that courts 
implement the intention of a testator instead of the judgment of the court.162 
Private contracts controlling digital assets are not aimed at distributing 
digital assets according to an account holder‘s testamentary intent.  Instead 
of abiding by the principles of succession law, companies, through carefully 
drafted contracts, determine whether assets—created through services or 
purchased in digital form—are devisable by an account holder or are 
subject to company control and subsequently deleted or destroyed.  We are 
allowing contracts to divest us of the ability to control our digital property 
and to redefine our property interests in digital assets. 
B.   Defining Digital Property 
Our conception of property arises out of our culture and laws.  It exists to 
the extent that we say it does and the law protects it.163  If current trends 
continue, corporations may reshape our property interest in digital assets by 
making them nontransferable at death.  We may be forced to accept that we 
do not have decision-making power over our digital assets and thus 
diminished property interests in the assets.  Perhaps in twenty years it will 
seem absurd to even think that we should have been able to devise our 
digital assets. 
Some contracts explicitly state that an account holder‘s digital assets do 
not constitute property, perhaps in an attempt to avoid the inheritance 
question altogether.164  The determination of whether or not assets are 
―property,‖ however, does not resolve the question of whether assets should 
be inheritable.  There is no singular accepted definition of property.  Courts 
and scholars view property as a bundle of rights, including the right to 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. See supra note 144. 
 162. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.6005(1) (West 2012) (―The intention of the testator 
as expressed in the will controls the legal effect of the testator‘s dispositions.  The rules of 
construction expressed in this part shall apply unless a contrary intention is indicated by the 
will.‖); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-33.1 (West 2007) (―In a will construction the effectuation of 
the testator‘s intent is the cornerstone.‖); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.227 (West 2003 & 
Supp. 2013) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-601 (Supp. 2013) (―The intention of a testator 
as expressed in the testator‘s will controls the legal effect of the testator‘s dispositions.‖). 
 163. Jeremy Bentham posited, ―Property and law are born together, and die together.  
Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases.‖ 
JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard Hildreth trans., 
Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1931) (1802); see also State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) 
(―Property rights serve human values.  They are recognized to that end, and are limited by 
it.  . . . [T]he law will deny the occupants the power to contract away what is deemed 
essential to their health, wealth, or dignity.‖). 
 164. DELTA, supra note 103 (―Miles are not the property of any member.‖); Membership 
Rewards Terms and Conditions, AM. EXPRESS, https://rewards.americanexpress.com/ 
myca/loyalty/us/catalog/tandc?tier=MR&mrk (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (―Points are not 
your property.‖). 
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transfer an asset during life and at death, and the rights to use, exclude, 
possess, and destroy.165  While digital assets may not be inheritable, an 
account holder clearly has the right to use them, to exclude others from 
using them, and to destroy them by deleting the account.  Labeling an asset 
as ―not property‖ has no effect on the analysis of whether the asset should 
be inheritable or not.  The nature of the asset and our control over it is more 
significant than its label.  Whether contracts state that the assets are not 
property or whether they contractually prohibit inheritance has the same 
result and the same question remains—whether contracts should be able to 
prohibit and control descendibility as a matter of public policy. 
Digital asset contracts that prohibit and control inheritance (no matter 
their methods) are reestablishing a kind of feudal digital property system.  
Our interest in our emails and social networking profiles is more akin to a 
life estate than a fee simple absolute because they are not capable of being 
included in our probate estate.166  By prohibiting transfer of digital assets, 
service providers act more like overlords over our personal digital assets 
than as corporations providing us with a service in exchange for advertising 
benefits and other forms of compensation.  Courts and legislatures would be 
well advised to consider the long-lasting effect on our system of property 
succession by allowing service providers to prohibit the transferability of 
digital assets at death. 
Internet service providers have more power than consumers to shape the 
market of digital assets because digital assets are a new form of asset.  
Courts, and most state legislatures, have yet to establish a norm for how 
digital assets should be treated at death.  Digital asset contracts are creating 
a new norm and new expectations regarding individuals‘ power over them 
at death.  Perhaps the public is more susceptible to allowing internet service 
providers to shape the development of digital assets because the assets are 
intangible and stored in a metaphorical cloud.167  In the convenience of the 
moment and without realizing its potential to force an alternative through 
exerting market pressure, the public is sacrificing a fundamental right to 
pass on their assets accumulated and created during their lives.168 
If we allow contracts to determine if our digital assets are distributed or 
destroyed at our death, we open the door to allowing contracts to prohibit 
the descendibility of our tangible assets and any newly developed class of 
assets in the future.  Consider how digital asset contracts could apply to the 
control of tangible assets.  It is possible that banks could agree to allow free 
checking accounts or other banking perks as long as a client agreed that all 
the assets in her account were not transferable at her death and by default 
 
 165. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (referring to ―the 
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property‖). 
 166. JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY:  A CONTEMPORARY 
APPROACH 316 (2d ed. 2012) (―An ordinary life estate is alienable, but not devisable or 
descendible.‖); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:  WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 1.1. cmt. b (2003). 
 167. See supra note 2. 
 168. For further discussion of public pressure on internet service providers, see infra Part 
III.A. 
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would go to the bank when she died.  Perhaps the administrative details of 
transferring the contents of an account to beneficiaries would be viewed as 
too burdensome or the bank would reason that it wanted to protect the 
privacy of an account.  If contractual terms can eliminate the right to 
transfer assets at death as a matter of public policy, banks would be free to 
impose conditions of this sort on their customers.  If customers had no 
alternative choice for banking, banking practices that were modeled after 
digital asset practices would change our conception of currency.  Such an 
arrangement may be possible through private contract but should not be 
enforceable because it violates policy principles of succession law and 
changes our property interest in our assets. 
Although it may seem far-fetched for a bank to control currency in such a 
manner, contracts are already being used to create and control different 
forms of currency.  Consider the rise of frequent flyer programs, which 
allow a person to enroll as a member of a certain airline and then 
accumulate points or miles for the distance flown using that airline.  Miles 
or status can then be redeemed for free flights, waived baggage fees, 
upgrades, priority bookings, or merchandise.169  During a member‘s life, a 
member can usually use, give, or donate the miles she has earned through 
her loyalty.170  At death, however, some programs prohibit a member from 
transferring or donating her miles via a testamentary instrument.171  Her 
interest in the miles disappears due to the contractual limits and policies 
placed on those interests by airlines.  Frequent flyer miles or rewards points 
function in many ways like a new currency controlled by airlines or credit 
card companies, which are destroyed at an owner‘s death. 
Similarly, we could imagine a system where property was sold under a 
contract that transferred it back to a seller or was destroyed at the death of 
an owner.  Furniture stores could begin to sell furniture under contracts that 
would require return or destruction of the furniture at the end of a 
purchaser‘s life.  In many ways, this scenario is already unfolding in the 
world of digital music, books, and videos.172  These digital assets are often 
licensed to a user instead of sold, which allows companies like Amazon or 
Apple to retain control of the media and prevent the transfer of such media 
 
 169. Use Miles, DELTA, https://www.delta.com/content/www/en_US/skymiles/use-miles. 
html (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (describing ways Delta frequent flyer members can use 
miles). 
 170. Id.; Program Terms and Conditions, supra note 114 (―A Member has the ability to 
transfer Rapid Rewards Points to another Member with an active Rapid Rewards account.‖); 
Use Award Miles, UNITED AIRLINES, http://www.united.com/web/en-
US/content/mileageplus/awards/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (describing ways to 
transfer or donate miles). 
 171. See supra notes 113–16. 
 172. Perhaps there is an argument that digital media sold under a license is less expensive 
because it does not include the right to devise the media at death, or that furniture sold under 
a contract requiring return at death would also be less expensive for purchasers.  Without an 
alternative market choice, however, it is unclear whether purchasers are truly paying less for 
a licensed good that cannot be devised.  A full market analysis of these issues is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
2014] INHERIT THE CLOUD 829 
at death.  In both scenarios, the benefit of not passing property at death 
accrues to sellers or service providers. 
As a practical matter, the decision to prohibit digital assets from being 
transferred at death is one made by internet service providers.  Internet 
service providers supply a necessary service and have a disproportionate 
amount of bargaining power.  A user has no ability to bargain for better 
terms.  An internet service provider sets the terms and conditions of use and 
allows those who agree to those terms to use the platform.  Those who do 
not agree must elect not to use the platform.  Their primary concern is to 
make decisions that benefit themselves, not to make decisions that uphold 
society‘s conception of property or are in accordance with American 
succession law.  The decision to prohibit descendibility benefits the service 
provider most, allowing corporations to avoid administrative hassle and 
promote more use and purchase of services and products.173  Digital asset 
contracts reshape our property interest in digital assets and give us fewer 
rights and less control over our digital assets than our physical assets.  What 
is especially troubling about digital asset contracts that control letters, 
photos, videos, and music or book licenses is that these digital goods are 
replacing traditionally physical goods, which were all inheritable and often 
treasured by those who received them.174 
Service providers are not focused on protecting an individual‘s control 
over assets she created, earned, or uploaded.  Protecting an individual‘s 
control over her assets or property interests is a concern of courts and 
legislatures.175  Courts and legislatures should continue to determine 
whether public policy favors digital asset inheritance. 
C.   Favoring Digital Asset Inheritance 
The state of the law concerning digital asset inheritance is in flux.  
Legislators, courts, and testators, despite an ever-pressing need for a 
framework for the inheritability of digital assets, have not uniformly or 
consistently considered these assets.  Although courts and legislatures have 
not found that prohibiting digital asset inheritance is void as a matter of 
public policy, their actions so far demonstrate that they favor inheritance, 
despite terms of private contracts that attempt to prohibit it. 
 
 173. See infra Part II.D for potential justifications of internet service providers. 
 174. E-book sales, for example, grew by 43 percent in 2013 while hardcover sales rose by 
6 percent and paperback sales dropped less than 1 percent.  E-book sales currently account 
for approximately 20 percent of all book sales reported by publishers. E-book Sales Are Up 
43%, but That‟s Still a „Slowdown,‟ USA TODAY (May 16, 2013, 11:16 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/books/2013/05/15/e-book-sales/2159117/. 
 175. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West Supp. 2014) (protecting a person‘s control 
of her ―name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness‖); Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 
N.W.2d 154, 161 (Wis. 1997) (awarding punitive damages to property owner after 
defendants intentionally trespassed on the land). 
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1.   State Legislation 
To date, six states have adopted reforms to promote fiduciary access to 
digital assets:  Connecticut,176 Rhode Island,177 Oklahoma,178 Indiana,179 
Idaho,180 and Delaware.181  Two other states—Virginia182 and Nevada183—
have passed limited reforms concerning digital asset access after death.  The 
first state to enact reform in this area was Connecticut in 2005, shortly 
followed by a similar law passed in Rhode Island in 2007.184  Connecticut‘s 
and Rhode Island‘s laws require email providers to grant executors access 
to, or copies of, the email of deceased persons if a request is made or if 
ordered by a probate court.185  Oklahoma, Indiana, and Idaho enacted 
broader legislation, allowing an executor to control or terminate any social 
networking, blog, or email account.186  Idaho also addressed the need for 
fiduciaries to access digital assets of incapacitated persons and gives the 
right to control or terminate digital accounts to conservators.187  Indiana‘s 
law allows custodians to access or gain copies of ―any documents or 
information of the deceased person stored electronically.‖188  Delaware‘s 
newly enacted law broadly defines digital assets and accounts and allows a 
fiduciary to ―exercise control over any and all rights in digital assets and 
digital accounts of an account holder.‖189 
Virginia and Nevada have passed very limited reforms relating to digital 
assets.  Virginia passed a law granting access to accounts of deceased 
minors in 2013.190  Virginia‘s law received public support and attention 
after parents of a minor who committed suicide fought a public battle with 
Facebook to try to gain access to their child‘s account to determine why he 
committed suicide.191  Nevada passed a law that grants a personal 
representative power to terminate an online account of a decedent subject to 
the restrictions prescribed by a decedent in a will or court order.192  Several 
states are considering legislation to address how digital assets are to be 
 
 176. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-334a (West 2014). 
 177. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3 (2011). 
 178. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 269 (2014). 
 179. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-13-1.1 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 180. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-424 (Supp. 2013). 
 181. Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets and Digital Accounts Act, 79 Del. Laws 416 
(effective Jan. 1, 2015), available at http://www.legis.delaware.gov/LIS/LIS147.NSF/ 
vwLegislation/HB+345?Opendocument. 
 182. VA. CODE. ANN. § 64.2-110 (Supp. 2013). 
 183. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 143.188 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
 184. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-334a (West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3. 
 185. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-334a; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3. 
 186. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715(28) (Supp. 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-13-1.1 
(LexisNexis 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 269 (2014). 
 187. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-424. 
 188. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-13-1.1. 
 189. Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets and Digital Accounts Act, 79 Del. Laws 416 
(effective Jan. 1, 2015), available at http://www.legis.delaware.gov/LIS/LIS147.NSF/ 
vwLegislation/HB+345?Opendocument. 
 190. VA. CODE. ANN. § 64.2-110 (Supp. 2013). 
 191. See Kunkle, supra note 95. 
 192. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 143.188 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
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handled after the death of an account holder.193  Legislation has failed to 
pass in at least some of those states, however, due to opposition from 
service providers.194 
None of the laws passed by state legislatures have been challenged or 
used by fiduciaries to force online companies to give them access to an 
account in court.  Perhaps online companies have readily acquiesced to the 
newly minted laws in these states and have granted access to executors who 
have sought it.  For those states that have passed legislation on the matter, 
however, the legislatures have enacted laws to promote the policy of 
allowing transfer and allowing a decedent‘s intent to govern the transfer of 
digital assets, thereby limiting the terms of a contract between an account 
holder and service provider.195  Contracts that attempt to bypass these state 
laws are illegal and against public policy favoring the freedom of 
disposition. 
Another indication that public policy favors digital asset inheritance is 
the current work done by the Uniform Law Commission, a nonprofit, 
nonpartisan group that has created a committee to study the issues relating 
to digital estate planning and to offer uniform legislation on the issue.196  
The Uniform Law Commission is currently drafting legislation that would 
―vest fiduciaries with the authority to access, manage, distribute, copy or 
delete digital assets and accounts.‖197  Once the Uniform Law Commission 
 
 193. See, e.g., Administration of Internet-Based Accounts, S. 29, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?pid 
=billpage&stab=01&id=SB0029&tab=subject3&ys=2013RS; S. 2313, 2011-2012 S., 187th 
Sess. (Mass. 2012), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/187/Senate/S02313; 
Neb. Legis. 783, 102d Legis., 2d Sess. (2012), http://nebraskalegislature.gov/bills/ 
view_bill.php?DocumentID=15623; A09317, St. Assemb., 2012 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2012), 
available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A09317&term=2011; S. 54, 77th Leg. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013), available at https://olis.leg.state.or.us/LIZ/2013R1/ 
Measures/Text/SB0054/Introduced. 
 194. See Katy Steinmetz, From Here to E-ternity:  What Happens to Your Virtual Things 
When You‟re Gone?, TIME, Feb. 11, 2013, at 54 (―In Massachusetts, Google lobbied against 
a digital assets bill.‖); Oregon Legislature Takes Up Fight to Save Digital Assets of 
Deceased, OPB (Mar. 1, 2013, 8:05 AM), http://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-
legislature-takes-up-fight-to-save-digital-assets-of-deceased/ (―The Oregon Legislature 
responded this week and took up the cause with a proposal that would have made it easier 
for loved ones to access the ‗digital assets‘ of the deceased, only to be turned back by 
pressure from the tech industry . . . .‖). 
 195. See, for example, a synopsis of the newly enacted Delaware law, which states that 
the Act should be construed liberally to allow access and control by a fiduciary. Fiduciary 
Access to Digital Assets and Digital Accounts Act, 79 Del. Laws 416 (effective Jan. 1, 
2015), available at http://www.legis.delaware.gov/LIS/LIS147.NSF/vwLegislation/ 
HB+345?Opendocument. 
 196. Committees:  Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets, UNIF. LAW COMM‘N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital
%20Assets (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).  As Professor Langbein describes, ―[t]he Uniform 
Law Commission is . . . a legislative drafting consortium of the state governments . . . .  The 
commissioners are appointed pursuant to statute in each state, mostly by the governor, and 
are a mix of practicing lawyers, legislators, judges, and law professors.‖ Langbein, supra 
note 12, at 3. 
 197. DRAFT FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT, NAT‘L CONFERENCE OF COMM‘RS 
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1 (2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/ 
Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2013AM_FADA_Draft.pdf. 
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drafts legislation, it will be incumbent upon the states to adopt the 
legislation.  Although the process is a slow one, uniform legislation would 
provide a helpful platform for state legislators in crafting their own 
legislation that best fits the needs of their constituents and protects the 
public policies of property succession.  The Uniform Law Commission‘s 
draft legislation demonstrates the movement toward favoring digital asset 
inheritance as a matter of public policy. 
2.   Court Cases 
There have been only a handful of cases where administrators or 
executors sought a decedent‘s digital assets.  The cases have all arisen in 
states that have not passed legislation on the matter.  Although courts have 
not directly addressed whether terms that prohibit transfer are valid, there is 
some indication that courts are hesitant to enforce contracts that deny 
descendibility.  In Ajemian, the only published case, administrators of their 
brother‘s estate brought an action in probate court against Yahoo! seeking a 
declaration that their brother‘s emails on Yahoo!‘s servers were property of 
the estate and therefore the administrators were entitled to access them.198  
John Ajemian opened his Yahoo! email account in 2002 and died in a car 
accident in 2006.199  After his death, Ajemian‘s brother and sister tried to 
gain access to his email account to notify his friends and family of his 
death.200  Although Yahoo! initially agreed to give the administrators the 
information they sought as long as they produced documentation of their 
brother‘s death, Yahoo! subsequently refused them access to the account.201  
Under the service agreement in effect in 2006, Yahoo! argued there was no 
right of survivorship in the email account and that it could not be 
transferred.202 
The court did not reach the issue of whether the email could be 
transferred, however, because Yahoo! moved to dismiss the suit in 
Massachusetts based on the forum selection provision in the agreement, 
which required suit to be brought in California.203  Although the probate 
court granted dismissal, on appeal, the court found that Yahoo! did not offer 
clear evidence that the terms of service amendments were reasonably 
communicated to the plaintiffs and refused to enforce the forum selection 
limitation in the contract.  The court also noted that the decedent was 
domiciled in Massachusetts at his death.204  It reversed the probate court 
and allowed litigation on the issue of whether the decedent‘s digital assets 
are part of his estate to continue in Massachusetts state court.205 
 
 198. Ajemian v. Yahoo!, 987 N.E.2d 604, 606–09 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013). 
 199. Id. at 607. 
 200. Id. at 608. 
 201. Id. at 609. 
 202. Id. at 608. 
 203. Id. at 609. 
 204. Id. at 615. 
 205. Id. 
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In re Ellsworth206 is a perfect example of the difficulties presented in 
litigating access to digital accounts and demonstrates why there is not more 
case law on inheritability of digital accounts.  In 2005, a father of a slain 
soldier in Iraq petitioned Yahoo! to give the contents of his son‘s email 
account to him despite a clear term in Yahoo!‘s service agreement stating 
that accounts were terminated upon death and not transferable.207  When 
Yahoo! refused, the father took the issue to Michigan probate court.208  The 
Michigan probate court ordered Yahoo! to give the contents of the email 
account to the soldier‘s father.  Instead of challenging the order, Yahoo! 
obliged but did not change its policy.209 
Yahoo! could have appealed the decision, arguing that the email account 
was not a probate asset, the assets were controlled by the terms of service 
agreement, and the terms of service agreement clearly stated that an account 
would be terminated upon the death of an account holder.  Yahoo!, 
however, gave up the fight after the probate court issued a mandate and sent 
the emails to Ellsworth‘s father.  Yahoo! obliged to the court order in this 
instance but declined to change its policy of nontransferability.210  Yahoo! 
thus demonstrated that it valued its terms of service agreement while 
appeasing the public by releasing the emails.  Yahoo! sent Ellsworth‘s 
father a compact disc with the account information211 for much less than it 
would cost to pay their legal team to appeal the probate court‘s mandate. 
Other cases involve families trying to gain access to a decedent‘s 
Facebook account in order to obtain information about a decedent‘s death.  
The threat of litigation, media attention, and legislative action have led 
Facebook to allow families limited access, demonstrating again that public 
policy favors inheritability of digital assets.  In 2005, the Williams family 
tried to access their son‘s account after he was killed in a motorcycle 
accident.212  After filing a lawsuit against Facebook, Facebook granted the 
mother of the deceased man ten months of access to his account and then 
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 207. See Yahoo Terms of Service, supra note 97. 
 208. See Justin‟s Family Fights Yahoo Over Access to His E-Mail Account, 
http://www.justinellsworth.net/email/yahoofight.htm (last updated Dec. 18, 2006, 8:11 PM) 
(collecting news articles about the Ellsworths‘ fight to get their son‘s emails); see also Who 
Owns Your E-mails?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ 
magazine/4164669.stm; Yahoo! Will Give Family Slain Marine‟s E-mail Account, USA 
TODAY (Apr. 21, 2005), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2005-04-21-marine-e-
mail_x.htm?POE=TECISVA. 
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your death.‖). 
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removed his profile.213  In 2011, a twenty-year-old posted a picture on 
Facebook of himself holding a gun to his mouth before taking his own 
life.214  Facebook did not grant the family access to the man‘s account215 
but eventually removed the picture after the media publicized Facebook‘s 
refusal.216  Similarly, a family struggling with their teenager‘s suicide 
petitioned Facebook for access to his account to find clues about what had 
driven him to suicide.217  Facebook refused initially, but the family 
continued to press Facebook for information.  Finally, Facebook gave the 
family a copy of his account on a CD.218  The family successfully lobbied 
Virginia‘s legislature to pass a law allowing parents access to their deceased 
minor‘s online accounts.219 
There is currently no guarantee that courts will allow families to access 
accounts of a decedent based on public policy arguments.  Although the 
trend seems to appear to favor inheritance, courts may still decide to 
enforce a service provider‘s policies.  A family recently filed suit in 
Northern California against Facebook trying to force Facebook to give them 
access to a family member‘s account.220  The woman died after falling from 
an apartment building in England, and her family petitioned for access to 
her Facebook account to prove that her death was not suicide.221  The court, 
however, granted Facebook‘s order to quash, and did not compel Facebook 
to give anything to her family.222 
D.   Justifying Companies‟ Contractual Choice 
As discussed above, contractual bars to devising digital assets prevail in 
today‘s legal landscape.  The silence of some terms of service agreements 
on the subject reveals that several service providers have not yet determined 
how to handle assets or accounts upon the death of an account holder.  
Others have made an affirmative decision to deny access or transferability 
of an account to an account holder‘s legal heirs in their terms of service 
agreements.  There are also reports that service providers have lobbied 
against state legislative reforms that would provide easier access to digital 
assets.223  In considering whether digital asset contracts that limit or 
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prohibit inheritance should be upheld on public policy grounds, we must 
also examine the potential policy justifications that service providers may 
offer for including these provisions. 
I suggest and refute three possible justifications companies may use to 
prohibit the intent of an account holder from determining how her digital 
assets should be distributed at her death.  First, companies may have 
administrative or cost concerns about allowing the transfer of an account 
from one user to another.  Second, companies may have concerns about 
protecting the privacy of their users.  Third, companies may fear that 
allowing the accounts to be devised would run afoul of federal privacy 
laws.  None of these reasons, however, justify the extraordinary measure of 
prohibiting or severely limiting transfer of digital assets. 
1.   Administrative and Cost Concerns 
Companies may prohibit digital assets from being inherited in their 
contracts due to administrative and cost concerns.  Managing requests from 
fiduciaries and beneficiaries is a potential drain on resources.  Offering a 
platform or service in perpetuity for people who have died may expend 
resources the company would like to use for account holders who are still 
living.  An economic analysis on how much service providers would need 
to spend in order to offer the ability for assets to be transferred at death is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but it is enough to note that administrative 
and cost concerns may encourage an increasing number of companies to 
have a clear-cut policy against descendibility.  Cost and administrative 
concerns are easily remedied, however, and cannot justify prohibiting 
transfer of digital assets altogether. 
Administrative and cost concerns to companies providing internet 
services could be alleviated by requiring beneficiaries who request assets to 
pay a reasonable fee for the transfer.  Assessing fees for added costs of 
transferring assets could offset any claimed administrative cost as well as 
ensure that those who truly appreciate the value of digital assets are able to 
obtain them.224  Many beneficiaries who seek access to a decedent‘s 
account do not expect the service provider to allow the account to remain 
on the provider‘s platform indefinitely.  Rather, they seek to access the 
account of a loved one and download any files they wish to keep.225  By 
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enacting a time limitation of one or two years in which beneficiaries could 
access an account, service providers could alleviate any additional cost of 
preserving an account after an account holder has died. 
In most situations, a user‘s digital assets are of little or no value to an 
internet service provider.  It is difficult to imagine a situation where 
Google, Microsoft, or Yahoo! could realize any value from a dead user‘s 
email account.  The value of the email accounts, if any, can only be realized 
by the beneficiaries of the deceased user, who would hold the copyright and 
right of publicity to profit from the emails.226 
Similarly, the value of frequent flyer miles is much less to the airline than 
to a passenger.  While the miles ―may be worth several hundred dollars to a 
passenger,‖ The Economist estimated in 2005 that each additional passenger 
costs an airline around $25.227  The frequent flyer programs earn an 
―estimated annual revenue of more than $10 billion for the industry 
worldwide.‖228  According to The Economist, when United Airlines filed 
for bankruptcy in 2002, it said that the frequent flyer program was the only 
part of the business that was making a profit.229  With such a profit-making 
system, it is difficult to see how airlines would not be able to pass on that 
cost of allowing members to transfer the miles they have already earned at 
death with a transfer fee. 
Some companies that allow transfer of assets at death have conquered 
potential administrative and cost concerns.  Google, for example, has 
created a method for users to determine whether they would like their 
account materials to be deleted after a certain amount of time or sent to 
trusted individuals.230  If an individual has not activated the Inactive 
Account Manager, beneficiaries may petition Google for access to a 
deceased person‘s account, but Google does not guarantee access.231  
Perhaps other online service providers will follow Google‘s example and 
allow an automatic way for the assets of an account to be transferred or 
deleted according to the intent of a testator.  On the other hand, because 
Google holds the decision-making power in this situation, it is possible that 
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Google could, at any time, do away with the Inactive Account Manager and 
prohibit its users from transferring digital assets at death. 
2.   Postmortem Privacy Concerns 
Companies cite concerns over user privacy as the main justification for 
their refusal to allow a decedent‘s estate to obtain digital assets.232  
Although privacy is an important factor in determining whether digital 
assets should be transmitted to beneficiaries, service providers are making 
decisions about privacy after death for its users.  State legislatures make 
default rules in succession through intestacy statutes, and thus are the 
proper body to establish default rules because such matters are ―fraught 
with questions of morality‖ and give the power to ―establish[] social 
norms.‖233  In the digital asset context, the default rule is established by the 
private sector in favor of deleting the contents of the email or social 
networking account, despite good reasons to transmit the contents of an 
account to a family.  While some individuals may celebrate this default rule 
of deletion, others may prefer to preserve their digital footprints for their 
beneficiaries.  People will have widely different views on how to treat their 
digital assets, but if the decision is made by appropriate legislative bodies, 
at least the decision maker will be held responsible through the electoral 
process.  Instead of supplanting the traditional role of the legislature in 
crafting default rules for succession and in the absence of legislative action, 
companies should defer to an individual‘s intent and construct a way for 
users to determine what happens to their account when they die.  This is the 
best way to effectuate users‘ testamentary intent, ensure privacy concerns 
are addressed, and abide by the age-old principles of American succession 
law. 
Companies‘ retreat behind the banner of privacy in refusing to transfer 
digital assets to beneficiaries is somewhat suspicious.  They may be more 
interested in lowering their liability exposure and costs than in forwarding 
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the cause of privacy.  Google, for example, is facing claims from users that 
it processes emails to provide targeted advertisements in a way that violates 
privacy.234  In the course of the litigation, Google argued that people have 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information turned over to third 
parties and that those who use web-based email cannot be surprised if their 
emails are processed by the recipient‘s electronic communication 
service.235  Thus, when it suited its own purposes, Google argued that 
privacy interests were narrower than users expected.  Without any law, our 
privacy interests in our digital assets remain at the whim of corporate 
America.  Service providers may champion privacy one day and trample it 
the next if it best suits their interests. 
Liability concerns about the privacy of digital assets may be exaggerated.  
Under the common law, the personal right to privacy does not survive 
death.236  The right to bring action for an invasion of privacy is a personal 
right, and traditionally personal rights are not assignable or descendible 
upon the death of an individual holding a personal right.237  Thus, a 
decedent‘s family or friends could not sue email or social networking 
service providers for a violation of privacy rights if the service providers 
released an account to a decedent‘s heirs.  As J. Thomas McCarthy, a 
leading scholar on the right to privacy explained, ―Traditional privacy rights 
protect various aspects of the dignitary, reputational, emotional, and 
physical rights of persons.  Once the subject person is dead, all these legal 
interests cease to be invaded.‖238  Thus, service providers cannot reasonably 
fear that releasing the contents of an online account to a family will subject 
them to liability under the common law. 
Service providers are not the appropriate arbiters of privacy.  Such an 
important decision should be made by an account holder or, if an account 
holder has not made his wishes known, by the legislature through intestacy 
laws.  The law does not protect the privacy interests of a decedent.239  As 
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emails and social networking accounts are the new letters and personal 
documents of the modern day, an analogy to a decedent‘s privacy rights in 
her tangible personal property is sound.  Digital assets are no different from 
other tangible assets that an individual might want to keep hidden from 
friends and family.  In order to do so, a person must take steps during her 
life in order to destroy letters, pictures, or materials that are purely personal.  
If she does not do so, her property, with all of its secrets, passes to her heirs 
at her death.  A decedent may leave instructions for an executor to destroy 
personal documents and letters, but there is no guarantee that an executor 
will follow a decedent‘s wishes or that a court will enforce a will that 
requires destruction.240 
Well before digital correspondence existed, those who wished to destroy 
their personal papers for privacy reasons usually did so before death.  Many 
U.S. presidents intentionally destroyed their presidential papers in order to 
ensure privacy.241  Justice Hugo Black infamously destroyed his Supreme 
Court notes and memoranda when he became sick before he resigned from 
the Court.242  Martha Washington‘s decision to destroy her personal 
correspondence with George Washington right before her death is also a 
well-known example of a public figure who decided to destroy personal 
correspondence to ensure privacy.243  Due to the presumption against 
destruction, particularly of records that hold historical import, American 
leaders knew that the best way to ensure the privacy of their correspondence 
was to destroy it themselves before their death. 
If testators are concerned about the privacy of their physical material, 
they ought to destroy it before they die or name a trusted executor who will 
fulfill their wishes.  Likewise, those who wish troubling or secretive 
correspondence or photos to be deleted should do so during their lives or 
make it clear that they wish their digital assets to be destroyed at their 
death.  There is no reason why our private digital assets should receive 
greater protection than our private tangible assets.  An account holder may 
intend for her accounts and emails to be deleted upon her death and not 
distributed to her legal heirs.  However, this should be a decision for an 
account holder to make, not a service provider. 
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3.   Federal Privacy Laws Concerns 
The third potential reason that service providers do not want to allow 
transfer of digital assets to beneficiaries stems from concern that 
transferring digital assets may violate federal privacy laws.  Service 
providers may be liable under the Stored Communications Act, which is 
part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.244  The Stored 
Communications Act was passed in 1986 and was enacted to protect the 
privacy of communications online.245  It does so by criminalizing the 
―intentional[] access[] without authorization [of] a facility through which an 
electronic communication service is provided.‖246  The Stored 
Communications Act also prohibits ―a person or entity providing an 
electronic communication service to the public‖ from ―knowingly 
divulg[ing] to any person or entity the contents of a communication while 
in electronic storage by that service‖247 unless the recipient of the 
information is an agent248 or the disclosure is done with the consent of the 
customer.249  If a company violates the Stored Communications Act, a 
company may be liable for statutory and punitive damages and attorney‘s 
fees.250 
Companies use the Stored Communications Act to try to avoid divulging 
the information and assets of online accounts.  In Ajemian, Yahoo! argued 
that it could not turn over the email account of a deceased user to his estate 
because doing so would violate the Stored Communications Act.251  
Interestingly, Yahoo! initially agreed to provide the family with the 
information they sought as long as the family provided documentation of 
the account holder‘s death.252  Later, however, Yahoo! refused to give the 
family the information they sought and cited the Stored Communications 
Act as a bar to further cooperation.253  To date, there is no case law where a 
court has interpreted the Stored Communications Act as prohibiting the 
transfer of an email account upon the death of an account holder.254  In an 
abundance of caution, however, Yahoo! claimed that the statute prohibited 
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the transfer of digital assets and refused to comply with the family‘s 
request.255 
Facebook has also cited the Stored Communications Act in refusing to 
give records of a deceased user‘s account to her family.256  When a woman 
died after falling from her apartment building in England, her family sought 
information from Facebook to see whether it held any clues about her 
death.257  The family persisted and sought a court order forcing Facebook to 
give them information about their loved one‘s account.  The court granted 
Facebook‘s order to quash, finding that the Stored Communications Act did 
not compel Facebook to give her information to her family.258  The court 
refused to decide whether the family‘s consent qualified as consent under 
the Stored Communications Act.259 
Service providers are using the Stored Communications Act as a 
justification to avoid distributing assets, but it is unlikely that the Stored 
Communications Act would apply to the transfer of digital assets at death.  
The Stored Communications Act was not intended to prevent the transfer of 
digital assets to beneficiaries.  In 1986, it was hardly possible for Congress 
to imagine a world where internet providers became the main custodians of 
personal correspondence, pictures, entertainment, and documents.  Despite 
companies‘ concern that the Stored Communications Act prevents the 
transfer of digital assets at death, it is unlikely that the federal authorities 
would prosecute a service provider for distributing digital assets of a 
decedent to a decedent‘s beneficiaries.260  It is also unlikely that those who 
received the assets would try to find a service provider liable for 
transferring the digital assets to them.  In addition, the Stored 
Communications Act allows access if an account owner consented.261  If a 
decedent leaves instructions in his will concerning his digital assets, service 
providers may respect the wishes of a testator without fear of civil liability.  
If a decedent does not leave instructions in his or her will a family should 
be able to provide the requisite consent to access a decedent‘s digital assets 
without subjecting the service providers to liability.262 
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As stated above, the Act has exceptions for agents of a recipient.263  
These exceptions are broad enough to allow the transfer of assets to a 
decedent‘s estate.  Fiduciaries of an estate are also agents of the estate and 
should have access to the accounts in the same way that a decedent had 
access to her accounts.  The Stored Communications Act should not be used 
to stifle the transfer of assets at death. 
*     *     * 
Although private contracts have always played a role in distributing 
newly emerged assets at death, digital asset contracts fundamentally differ 
from other private contracts that facilitate inheritance.  Instead of 
facilitating transfer of assets, digital asset contracts severely limit transfer 
and ignore the intention of an account holder.  Digital asset contracts may 
be valid, but enforcing them fundamentally shifts American succession law 
out of the control and power of decedents and into the hands of service 
providers, especially as digital counterparts continue to replace our tangible 
assets.  The next section offers suggestions for how we can reclaim control 
over the ultimate fate of our digital assets before it is too late. 
III.   RECLAIMING DIGITAL ASSETS 
If nothing is done, service providers will continue to dictate the 
development of law and practice in the digital asset arena.  Many 
commentators have suggested legislation to ensure that account holders do 
not lose their digital assets at death,264 and legislation is being developed in 
states and by the Uniform Law Commission.265  The legislation that has 
been passed has not been tested and the effect of such legislation remains 
unknown.266  Although legislation is an important part of the solution, this 
Article suggests three other considerations to ensure digital assets are 
inheritable.  First, it is important to recognize that corporations and 
companies that hold digital assets are service providers and subject to 
consumers‘ continuing business or loyalty.  If consumers are more aware of 
the contractual terms concerning inheritance of their digital assets, public 
sentiment may force corporations to reshape their treatment of digital 
assets. 
Second, as I have shown in this Article, private contracts have been 
widely used to transfer assets in a seamless fashion without interference 
from courts or legislatures.  States have upheld nonprobate transfers as an 
adequate and sometimes preferable method of transfer.  There is no reason 
why transfer of digital assets should not occur by private contract, as long 
 
 263. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1). 
 264. See, e.g., Conner, supra note 9; Kutler, supra note 9; Tarney, supra note 9. 
 265. Nat‘l Conference of Comm‘rs of Unif. State Laws, Fiduciary Access to Digital 
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ANN. § 45a-334a (West 2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715(28) (2011); IND. CODE ANN. 
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2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 269 (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3 (2011); VA. CODE. ANN. 
§ 64.2-110 (Supp. 2013). 
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as digital asset contracts, like life insurance, retirement, and bank account 
contracts, allow transfer and allow a testator to make the determination 
about where his assets will go at death. 
Third, I argue that when a decedent has not clearly expressed her 
intention, courts and legislatures should be more sensitive to the desires and 
wishes of beneficiaries than the terms and policies established by service 
providers.  Although American succession law usually does not look to 
beneficiaries‘ wishes or desires in transferring assets, digital asset transfers 
are different because beneficiaries will benefit more from the digital assets 
of their loved ones than the service providers who will end up deleting the 
accounts.  When questions arise, beneficiaries‘ interest in preservation 
should trump the service providers‘ interest in destruction. 
By encouraging public awareness, allowing digital asset contracts to 
distribute assets as part of the nonprobate system, and focusing on the 
beneficiaries‘ interests in transferring digital assets instead of service 
providers‘ interest if a decedent has not made her intention known, digital 
assets will be reclaimed by those who created or earned them. 
A.   Channeling Public Sentiment 
Digital asset service providers all have one thing in common:  they 
depend on cultivating a reputation of being fair, dependable, and customer 
friendly.  Whether a company is an email provider or an airline, both need 
good relationships with account holders and customers to succeed.  If the 
public were more aware of the distribution decisions that were made by 
service providers about their digital assets, perhaps public sentiment on the 
issue and market pressures could force service providers to reshape their 
policies.  Otherwise, the public will continue acquiescing to the terms of 
agreement put forward by service providers, agreements that show little 
concern about the testamentary intent and desires of an account holder. 
Digital asset service providers may be particularly sensitive to public 
sentiment because users can use digital platforms to quickly and efficiently 
communicate disapproval and outrage.267  For example, in 2009, Facebook 
encountered stiff disapproval from the public when it changed its terms of 
service agreement to allow Facebook a right to use, copy, or publish posts 
of Facebook users.268  After three days of a flurry of angry Facebook posts 
from users around the world and threats of litigation from consumer 
advocacy groups, Facebook reverted to its old policy and disclaimed any 
intention to take away users‘ ownership rights in their posts.269  Facebook 
 
 267. Ian Parker, Being the Squeaky Wheel on Social Media, KATU.COM (Feb. 4, 2014, 
4:35 PM), http://www.katu.com/news/local/Being-the-squeaky-wheel-on-social-media-
243421891.html; Jon Swartz, Social Media Like Twitter Change Customer Service, USA 
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 268. Brad Stone & Brian Stelter, Facebook Backtracks on Use Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
18, 2009, at B1. 
 269. Id. (―Facebook‘s retreat can also be credited to the mass of members who made their 
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also has been responsive to users‘ concerns about publicly available lists of 
―friends.‖270  Perhaps if users were more knowledgeable about what occurs 
to their Facebook profile at death, there would be more of a public outcry 
for Facebook to change its policies to allow the user to decide how an 
account should be treated at death. 
Pushback from the public will only be effective if consumers are aware 
of changes made to policies governing digital assets.  Facebook‘s privacy 
policy change in 2009 was observed and publicized by watchdog groups, 
and information about the changes was quickly disseminated.271  Other 
service providers have made changes with less public attention.  Just last 
year, for example, Delta allowed the transfer of deceased members‘ miles 
with certain proof of death.272  Delta quietly changed its policies in March 
2013 and received only a small amount of negative press.273  Without more 
press and more angry customers, Delta (unlike Facebook) will not be forced 
to reexamine its policy and non-transferability at death of frequent flyer 
miles will be the norm. 
Customer pushback has made a difference on an individual level.  
Although contractual language in digital asset contracts may be clear in 
dictating whether a service provider allows transfer of an account at the 
death of an account holder, the contractual language may not be the last 
word on the issue.  Email providers, airlines, and social networking 
platforms provide a service to the public.  Their success is contingent on 
accumulating many users who are happy with the service provided.  It is 
possible that customer service representatives would allow transfer of the 
account despite what the terms of service agreement states.  There is 
anecdotal evidence that companies have agreed to transfer assets despite 
contrary contractual language.274  For example, The New York Times 
reported that even when the terms of service agreement states that miles 
cannot be transferred on death, in some situations, customer service 
representatives have allowed transfer when a customer has contacted the 
airline directly.275 
Consumers should understand that under many of their digital asset 
contracts, they do not have the authority to make decisions about what 
happens to their account at their death.  In traditional succession law, the 
decision-making authority over a decedent‘s property transfers to an 
executor or trustee who is compelled by fiduciary duties to implement the 
intent of a testator.276  When an individual contracts with a corporation to 
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relinquish this decision-making power, however, the corporation steps in 
for a decedent and determines how a decedent‘s digital assets will be 
treated.  If customers voice their disapproval of not having the decision-
making power over their digital assets, perhaps they will encourage 
competition among digital asset service providers.  Consumers may be 
more likely to use a social networking platform, email service provider, or 
airline if they know that they will be able to determine what happens to that 
asset at death. 
Relying solely on market pressure and channeling public sentiment, 
however, may not be adequate to fully address the public policy concerns 
presented by digital asset contracts for several reasons.  First, people do not 
like confronting their mortality by making decisions about what happens to 
assets when they die.  Only about one-half of Americans have drafted a will 
to distribute their tangible assets.277  It may be difficult to harness enough 
public support and attention to force service providers to allow the transfer 
of digital assets because people simply do not want to think about their 
death.  Second, those most affected by a company‘s contract provision 
prohibiting inheritance are a decedent‘s heirs.  Heirs are not involved in 
negotiating a contract and their interests are not considered in digital asset 
contracts.  Third, because digital assets are a new form of asset, digital asset 
contracts have more leeway in creating a new norm and in shaping account 
holders‘ expectations about their accounts.  Lastly, customers may not be 
aware of a service provider‘s policies regarding descendibility.  These 
policies constantly change and are buried in fine print.278  Knowing that 
individuals are less likely to press the issue of descendibility, that those 
most affected by the decision to prohibit inheritability are not involved in 
the negotiation or acceptance of a contract, and that digital assets contracts 
are shaping a new norm, internet service providers hold a disproportionate 
amount of bargaining power.  Americans will likely lose control over their 
digital assets at death if they allow the market to shape their interests in 
those assets by continuing to rely on internet service providers‘ policies and 
goodwill. 
If Americans become sufficiently aware of and concerned about the 
disappearance of digital assets at death, they will be able to create the 
outcry needed to force corporations to reshape their policies or to provide 
the impetus for new corporations to rise that will address public concerns.  
Inertia is on the side of service providers to dictate the terms of digital asset 
inheritance or destruction.  It is possible for public opinion to be the 
ultimate arbiter of digital asset distribution, as long as public sentiment can 
be channeled to force service providers to be responsive to their customers. 
B.   Using the Nonprobate System 
If a contract allows for digital assets to transfer at death, the nonprobate 
system is best equipped to effectuate the transfer.  There is no need to 
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reinvent the wheel for digital asset transfers by adopting new kinds of trusts 
or testamentary instruments.  As long as service providers allow transfer 
and allow an account holder‘s testamentary intent to dictate transfer through 
digital asset contracts, the nonprobate system will work as it has for newly 
emerged assets in the last hundred years. 
For those agreements that allow transfer of an account at an account 
holder‘s death, assets can be transferred outside of probate through a private 
transaction.  There are only two options to transfer property upon death:  
probate transfer or nonprobate transfer.279  Whether property is categorized 
as probate or nonprobate is usually determined by private agreement.280  In 
a nonprobate transfer, a valid will substitute passes a property interest 
according to the terms of an agreement between parties.281  If a will 
substitute fails or does not exist, the property will pass through the laws of 
intestacy.282  In the six states that have enacted legislation relating to digital 
accounts, digital assets are treated as part of the probate estate of a decedent 
and an executor or personal representative is authorized to access the 
account.283  None of these statutes has been challenged, but states have long 
regulated the transfer of probate and nonprobate property.  Even without 
statutory authorization, digital assets easily transfer much like other 
nonprobate assets according to the terms and service agreement of a service 
provider.284 
The nonprobate system of transfer provides a solid framework for 
inheritability of digital assets because of key similarities.  First, like digital 
assets, nonprobate transfers are controlled by private agreements.285  The 
distribution terms, beneficiary designations, and other terms of the accounts 
vary by service provider.  Courts usually uphold the terms of an agreement 
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between parties over contrary provisions in wills.286  Digital accounts and 
life insurance, pay-on-death, pension, retirement, or other bank accounts are 
asset specific, meaning that each asset has a different agreement directing 
its transfer at a decedent‘s death.287  Although estate planners may find it 
difficult to coordinate the transfer of different assets, the transfers do occur 
according to specific policies.288  Also, much like digital assets, people 
often have several different financial accounts, insurance agreements, or 
retirement accounts, each with potentially different beneficiary 
designations.289  No matter the number of accounts a person owns, each 
individual account is sufficient to transfer assets to an executor or 
beneficiaries.290  Digital assets are well suited to follow the pattern and 
usage of other nonprobate, contractual transfers. 
Like digital assets, some modern nonprobate transfers are relatively new.  
For example, in 1989, the first uniform legislation to promote contractual 
transfer-on-death beneficiary designations for mutual funds and brokerage 
accounts was introduced.291  Today, many mutual funds transfer according 
to private transfer-on-death agreements seamlessly and efficiently.292  
Uniform legislation, much like the legislation presented in 1989 on 
nonprobate transfers, is currently being drafted to ensure that fiduciaries 
have access to digital accounts at a person‘s death.293  With the vast growth 
in digital assets and uniform legislation being developed, digital assets 
could follow the path of nonprobate assets and be transferred according to 
private agreements and be sanctioned by state legislation. 
Google has started allowing transfer of digital assets to be accomplished 
through private agreement.  Google has created a method for users to 
determine whether they would like their account materials to be deleted 
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after a certain amount of time or sent to trusted individuals.294  Ideally, 
other digital asset providers will follow Google‘s example and allow 
account holders to transfer assets according to their testamentary intent.  If 
service providers create a system to transfer assets according to the terms of 
an agreement, there is no reason why a digital asset contract, like many 
other nonprobate agreements, should not efficiently and effectively control 
the transfer to a decedent‘s beneficiaries or executor. 
C.   Focusing on Beneficiaries 
If a decedent has made her intent known concerning digital assets, then 
executors, service providers, and courts should effectuate that testamentary 
intent.  If a decedent has not made her desires known about how to handle 
her digital assets, courts and legislatures should give more weight to the 
desires of beneficiaries than to the policies of service providers, especially 
when service providers‘ policies result in destruction.  Focusing on 
beneficiaries‘ desires instead of the corporate policies will better serve 
society‘s interests in preserving digital assets and transferring them for 
productive use. 
1.   Beneficiaries‘ Desires and Presumed Intent 
Although the interests and desires of beneficiaries are rarely, if ever, 
taken into account in the American system of succession,295 the interests of 
beneficiaries should take a more prominent role in determining how digital 
assets should be distributed when it comes to enacting intestacy rules for 
digital assets.  This is primarily because decedents‘ intent concerning digital 
assets is difficult to discern. 
State intestacy laws distribute a decedent‘s property according to a 
legislature‘s presumption of what a reasonable decedent would have 
intended.296  Digital assets create a new wrinkle in presuming testamentary 
intent.  More than ever before, our intimate conversations and thoughts are 
preserved through a digital medium.  Some of us are alarmed at the idea 
that our loved ones could have access to our digital accounts when we 
die.297  Others would prefer to preserve the memories, pictures, and 
personal correspondence stored in emails and social networking sites for 
future generations.  The traditional focus of presumed intent is difficult with 
digital assets because both destruction and preservation are reasonable 
decisions for a person to make.  Legislatures have the responsibility of 
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crafting a default rule that best meets the needs of their constituents, but not 
all states have tackled this difficult area. 
Instead of focusing on the presumed intent of a decedent who left no 
indication of intent, courts and legislatures should focus on whether the 
beneficiaries want a decedent‘s digital assets at all.  The states that have 
passed legislation allow executors or personal representatives to access 
email accounts but do not require access to be explicitly granted by a 
decedent.298  In this way, it appears that in the absence of guidance from a 
decedent, an executor and beneficiaries may choose whether they will seek 
access to a decedent‘s digital accounts.  The statutes, then, seem to focus on 
the desires of the beneficiaries instead of trying to determine what a 
decedent intended. 
To understand how statutes give preference to beneficiaries, we must 
understand how executors and personal representatives operate.  Most 
people name a trusted family member or friend to be executor of their estate 
in their will.  If an individual does not name an executor, the court will 
appoint a personal representative (also called an administrator), giving 
preference to family members.299  In many cases, a personal representative 
is also a beneficiary of the estate.300  Executors and personal representatives 
are fiduciaries and thus owe various fiduciary duties to beneficiaries.301  
One of the primary duties of an executor or personal representative is to 
collect and distribute assets of an estate.302  Thus, if a state grants executors 
or personal representatives access to digital assets, it would be incumbent 
upon a fiduciary to exercise prudence, reasonable care, and reasonable skill 
in collecting digital assets. 
The exercise of fiduciary duties is rarely hard and fast.  Instead, fiduciary 
duties allow an executor or personal representative flexibility in managing 
an estate according to a general standard of reasonableness and care.303  It is 
the duty of an executor to disclose complete and accurate information 
regarding access to digital assets, which may affect beneficiaries‘ rights or 
decisions.304  If beneficiaries are not interested in obtaining access to emails 
or social networking sites, an executor or personal representative will not be 
required to collect and distribute the assets.305  Perhaps beneficiaries will 
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view digital assets with the same kind of apathy as they would view their 
loved one‘s old, dusty files or record collections.  If beneficiaries are not 
interested in a decedent‘s assets, an executor is free to throw away or donate 
those assets.306  Similarly, if beneficiaries are not interested in computer 
files or emails, an executor will be free to request that the service provider 
delete the contents of the account. 
If there is a dispute about how to handle digital assets that the parties 
cannot resolve, the parties will be able to file a complaint in state court. 
2.   Value Realized by Beneficiaries 
Beneficiaries‘ desires should also play a role in distributing digital assets, 
especially emails and social networking sites, because in most cases the 
assets are only valuable to the beneficiaries.  Digital assets may not have an 
objective monetary value but could have a great deal of emotional or 
sentimental value to a family.  Beneficiaries are in the best position to put 
property to productive use.  The only other alternative is destruction of 
digital assets by service providers. 
Social networking sites, personal webpages, or blogs already serve as a 
virtual memorial to a loved one and allow friends and family a digital way 
to mourn together.307  Facebook has adopted an approach to allow a 
memorial page for a deceased user‘s account.  In 2013, it was estimated that 
30 million Facebook users‘ pages had become memorial sites to honor 
deceased users.308  Facebook allows the family of the deceased to choose 
whether the site will become a memorial or be shut down.309  Others have 
found comfort in reading old emails and even tracing purchases on a loved 
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 309. See How Do I Report a Deceased Person or an Account That Needs to Be 
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one‘s eBay account in order to gain a deeper understanding of a deceased 
person‘s life.310 
The lack of monetary value of digital assets does not diminish the law‘s 
protection of the beneficiaries‘ interest in preserving digital assets.  
American law is not blind to emotional interests.  For example, courts have 
found that emotional or sentimental interests in property should be taken 
into account when determining whether a partition should occur by sale or 
in kind.311  In addition, emotional harm can be compensated under tort law.  
As early as 1950, courts applied the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress to remedy emotional harm.312  Under this tort, the law 
will remedy emotional harm to an individual if he can show that the 
defendant acted intentionally or recklessly in an extreme or outrageous 
manner and that the defendant‘s act caused the plaintiff to suffer severe 
emotional distress.313  Courts also allow recovery for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, where the defendant‘s action comes close to physically 
damaging the plaintiff but does not.314  The law also regularly compensates 
plaintiffs for the loss of consortium, which is based on the emotional and 
physical loss of a spouse or love or affection of a family member.315  The 
law should also protect beneficiaries‘ emotional interests in the digital 
assets of their deceased loved ones.  Preserving digital correspondence, 
pictures, videos, and posts for their emotional value is as important as 
preserving assets with monetary value. 
The law is also not blind to protecting the financial interests of 
beneficiaries.  In recent years, courts and legislatures have allowed living 
beneficiaries to enjoy a decedent‘s publicity rights.316  Families of famous 
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852 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
decedents can share in the handsome profits from the image, voice, and 
footage of their family members.  It is reported that Martin Luther King, 
Jr.‘s family is still being paid for the commercial use of his words and was 
compensated when the nation built the Martin Luther King, Jr. monument 
in Washington, D.C.317  Allowing a descendible right of publicity benefits 
the beneficiaries and puts their interests first. 
Email accounts and social networking sites are the new letters and 
personal records of today‘s society.  The historical importance of our digital 
records cannot be underestimated.  Our digital records offer valuable insight 
into the society in which we live.  As such, beneficiaries may wish to 
preserve those records for future generations and historians.  People 
document their lives online through email, pictures, and videos more than 
ever before, but, without a policy in favor of preserving this information at 
the beneficiaries‘ request, all of the information will be lost.  Never before 
has more information about the lives of ordinary citizens been created and 
saved.  In the past two years we have accumulated more data than the entire 
combined record of human civilization.318  And our capacity to store more 
data and information is growing at an exponential rate.319  Deven Desai has 
argued that ―[t]he uneven and unclear management of [digital] creations 
means that society will lose access to perhaps the greatest chronicling of 
human experiences ever.‖320 
Beneficiaries‘ desire for preservation of digital assets should be honored 
as well because there is a presumption against destruction by testamentary 
instrument.  If beneficiaries do not obtain digital assets, destruction of those 
assets is the only other alternative.  Courts usually overturn provisions in 
wills that mandate destruction of a testator‘s property.  The most common 
situation is where a testator dictates in her will that her home should be 
destroyed at her death.321  Courts have usually refused to allow destruction 
of property at death because it injures neighbors and the community, and 
causes monetary loss to beneficiaries.322  Commentators have added that 
the dead do not have to live with the consequences of their decision to 
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destroy their property.323  Similarly, courts and legislatures should 
recognize the presumption against destruction in deciding how to handle 
digital assets at death.  If a decedent has not made his wishes known and 
beneficiaries desire to obtain the digital assets for personal reasons or 
historical significance, courts and legislatures should allow beneficiaries 
access to the accounts, thereby promoting productive use of the assets over 
destruction. 
CONCLUSION 
The treatment of digital assets at an account holder‘s death is 
undermining American succession law.  Through the use of private 
contracts, Americans have lost the ability to control how a significant and 
increasingly important asset is treated at their death.  Contractual provisions 
are altering succession law on an ad hoc basis, with terms in individual 
contracts that best promote the service provider‘s interests and not 
necessarily the interests of society as a whole.  Reform should be principled 
and conscious, and not be based solely on contractual terms imposed by 
service providers.  If no action is taken by the public, state legislatures, or 
courts, corporations will continue to exercise unbridled power over the 
digital assets accumulated during our lives.  As a result, families and future 
generations may lose an entire category of valuable and historically 
significant assets. 
This Article has shown that private contracts have played an important 
role in facilitating inheritance, especially with newly emerging assets.  
Digital asset contracts, however, take the unprecedented step of prohibiting 
or severely limiting transfer of the asset.  Although the formation of digital 
asset contracts may be valid, this Article has argued that the terms 
prohibiting inheritance and ignoring the testamentary intent of a testator 
should be unenforceable as against public policy.  This Article has explored 
possible justifications for companies to prohibit transfer and has argued that 
they are lacking:  administrative or cost concerns can easily be handled by 
charging a transfer fee, privacy concerns do not extend beyond death, and 
federal law is unlikely to apply to state succession issues. 
Lastly, this Article has argued that the use of private contracts to 
facilitate transfer is an efficient and effective way to ensure that assets are 
transferred according to a decedent‘s testamentary intent.  The best solution 
is for public sentiment to force corporations to reshape their digital asset 
policies and allow for transfer according to the desires of an account holder.  
The nonprobate system is well suited to transfer assets according to private 
agreement.  If a decedent‘s intent is unknown, legislatures and courts 
should focus on the desires of the beneficiaries, as digital assets have the 
most value and significance to families and friends of an account holder.  
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By encouraging public awareness and action, Americans may have the best 
avenue to reclaim control over their digital assets. 
